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HOW MANY FIDUCIARY DUTIES ARE
THERE IN CORPORATE LAW?
JULIAN VELASCO*

ABSTRACT
Historically,there existed two main fiduciary duties in corporate law,
care and loyalty, and only violations of the duty of loyalty were likely to
lead to liability. In the 1980s and 1990s, the Delaware Supreme Court
breathed life into the duty of care, created a number of intermediate
standards of review, elevated the duty of goodfaith to equal standing with
care and loyalty, and announced a unified test for review of breaches of
fiduciary duty. The law, which once seemed so straightforward,suddenly
became elaborate and complex. In 2006, in the case of Stone v. Ritter, the
Delaware Supreme Court rejected the triadic formulation and declared
that good faith was a component of the duty of loyalty. In this and other
respects, Delaware seems to be returning to a bifurcated understandingof
the law offiduciary duties. I believe that this is a mistake. This area of law
is inherently complex and much too importantto be oversimplified.
The current academic debate on the issue focuses on whether there
should be two duties or three. In this Article, I argue that the question is
misleading and irrelevant, but that if it must be asked, the best answer is
that there are five duties-one for each paradigm of enforcement. In
defending this claim, I explain the true nature of fiduciary duties and
provide a robust framework for the discussion, implementation, and
development of the law.

* Associate Professor of Law, Notre Dame Law School; B.S. 1991, Georgetown University;
J.D. 1994, Columbia University. I would like to thank Matt Barrett, Lisa Casey, Deborah DeMott,
Lyman Johnson, Brett McDonnell, and David Millon for their thoughts and comments; and Shelby Lile
and Christopher Nichols for their excellent student assistance.
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I. INTRODUCTION
Historically, the law of fiduciary duties was fairly simple, at least with
respect to corporate directors. 1 There were two main duties: the duty of
1. I am limiting the discussion to directors in order to avoid the possibly thorny issue of the
extent to which fiduciary duties and the business judgment rule apply to corporate officers. See Gantler
v. Stephens, 965 A.2d 695, 708-09 & n.37 (Del. 2009) (holding that officers have the same fiduciary
duties as directors, but noting that the consequences are not necessarily the same). Compare Lyman
P.Q. Johnson, CorporateOfficers and the Business Judgment Rule, 60 BUS. LAW. 439 (2005) (arguing
why, according to agency theory, the protection of the business judgment rule should not extend to
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care and the duty of loyalty. Alleged breaches of the duty of care were
protected by the business judgment rule; alleged breaches of the duty of
loyalty were reviewed under the entire fairness test. Only violations of the
duty of loyalty were likely to lead to liability.
The current state of the law is significantly more complex. The
Delaware courts, in particular, have been busy actively rethinking the law
of fiduciary duties on many different fronts. In 1985, in the landmark case
Smith v. Van Gorkom, the Delaware Supreme Court shocked the legal and
business communities by holding directors liable for breaching the duty of
care even though many did not consider their conduct inappropriate.2 At
around the same time, the court began to announce a number of
intermediate standards of review for situations in which neither the
business judgment rule nor the entire fairness test seemed appropriate.3 In
1993, in the case of Cede & Co. v. Technicolor, Inc.,4 the Delaware
Supreme Court made two additional announcements. The first was that,
rather than being bifurcated, the law of fiduciary duties actually was
divided into three branches, with good faith joining care and loyalty in a
triad of fiduciary duties. The second was that enforcement of fiduciary
duties would be subject to a unified test, with both the business judgment
rule and a fairness inquiry having application in every case. 5 Subsequently,
corporate officers), and Lyman P.Q. Johnson & David Millon, Recalling Why Corporate Officers Are
Fiduciaries,46 WM. & MARY L. REV. 1597 (2005) (discussing the application of agency theory to
officer-director relationships to establish appropriate fiduciary duties for officers that are different from
those of directors), with Gregory Scott Crespi, Should the Business Judgment Rule Apply to Corporate
Officers, and Does It Matter?, 31 OKLA. CITY U. L. REV. 237 (2006) (arguing that the protection of the
business judgment rule should be extended to officers in derivative shareholder lawsuits opposed by the
board but not in claims initiated by the board or supported by the board), and Lawrence A. Hamermesh
& A. Gilchrist Sparks Il, CorporateOfficers and the Business Judgment Rule: A Reply to Professor
Johnson, 60 BUS. LAW. 865 (2005) (arguing that the protection of the business judgment rule should
apply with equal force to both officers and directors).
2. Smith v. Van Gorkom, 488 A.2d 858, 872-73, 893 (Del. 1985) (holding directors liable for
breach of the duty of care), overruled on other grounds by Gantler v. Stephens, 965 A.2d 695, 713 n.54
(Del. 2009).
3. See, e.g., Revlon, Inc. v. MacAndrews & Forbes Holdings, Inc., 506 A.2d 173, 182, 184
(Del. 1986) (holding that, in situations where a break up of the company or a change of control becomes
inevitable, directors have a duty to maximize shareholder value); Unocal Corp. v. Mesa Petroleum Co.,
493 A.2d 946, 955 (Del. 1985) (holding that directors' actions to resist a hostile takeover will be upheld
only if there are reasonable grounds to believe that the offer poses a threat and the response is
reasonable in relation to the threat); Zapata Corp. v. Maldonado, 430 A.2d 779, 788-89 (Del. 1981)
(holding that a motion to dismiss shareholder litigation made by a committee of the board of directors
will be upheld only if the independence and good faith of the committee are established and the motion
comports to the court's independent business judgment).
4. Cede & Co. v. Technicolor, Inc., 634 A.2d 345 (Del. 1993).
5. Id. at 361.
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in In re The Walt Disney Co. Derivative Litigation, the Delaware courts
began to breathe life into the duty of good faith.6 Fiduciary duties, which
7
once seemed so straightforward, suddenly became elaborate and complex.
It is not surprising, then, to find that many scholars and jurists have
been seeking to return the law of fiduciary duties to greater simplicity. One
manifestation of this movement is rebifurcation. In the 2006 case Stone ex
rel. AmSouth Bancorporation v. Ritter, the Delaware Supreme Court
rejected the triadic formulation of fiduciary duties and declared that the
duty of good faith was actually a component of the duty of loyalty.'
Moreover, one could argue that, over time, the various intermediate
standards of review have been watered down to the point where they
provide little more scrutiny than the business judgment rule. 9 Delaware
seems to be returning to a bifurcated understanding of the law of fiduciary
duties-a move which surely would be applauded by many.
I believe that rebifurcation would be a mistake. The law of fiduciary
duties is inherently complex and much too important to be oversimplified.
Clarification is important, and some pruning may be necessary.
Nevertheless, if fiduciary duties are to serve their purpose of protecting
shareholders, the law must preserve the nuance and precision that has
developed over the years.
The benefit of bifurcation is that it can distinguish situations that are
likely to lead to liability from those that are not. Although this is a valid
distinction, it is not the only relevant difference among fiduciary duties. A
more meaningful distinction would focus on the standards of review that
the courts employ to adjudicate allegations of breach. This would say more
about the issues involved than just the bottom line.
There are at least five different paradigms for the enforcement of
6. In re The Walt Disney Co. Derivative Litig., 906 A.2d 27, 62-68 (Del. 2006) (outlining the
concept of good faith); In re The Walt Disney Co. Derivative Litig., 907 A.2d 693, 755-56 (Del. Ch.
2005) (holding that the plaintiff can establish lack of good faith on the part of a director by proving
"intentional dereliction of duty" or "conscious disregard for one's responsibilities"), aff'd, Disney, 906
A.2d 27.
7. There are other ways in which Delaware complicated the law of fiduciary duties as well. For
example, the Delaware Supreme Court has decided that director exculpation charter provisions should
be interpreted as an affirmative defense rather than as a bar to liability. See Emerald Partners v. Berlin,
726 A.2d 1215, 1223-24 (Del. 1999). Such complications are not directly relevant to this paper.
8. Stone ex rel. AmSouth Bancorporation v. Ritter, 911 A.2d 362, 369-70 (Del. 2006).
9. See Julian Velasco, The Enduring Illegitimacy of the Poison Pill, 27 J. CORP. L. 381, 423
(2002).
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fiduciary duties.' The first two are obvious, and roughly correspond to the
duties of care and loyalty. The decisionmaking process is reviewed under a
lenient gross negligence standard, and conflicts of interest are reviewed
under a demanding entire fairness standard. Because these standards of
review are so divergent, it was inevitable that one or more intermediate
tests would develop. The third paradigm is the result. The Delaware courts
have created a number of intermediate standards of review to deal with
structural bias in corporate transactions. These tests can be lumped together
under the concept of reasonableness. The fourth paradigm deals with
intentional misconduct. This is qualitatively different from carelessness,
conflict, or bias. Misconduct is reviewed under a deferential intent
standard. The fifth paradigm deals with the business decisions themselves.
Claims rooted in the substance of business decisions are reviewed under the
most deferential standard of all: irrationality or waste.
These five paradigms represent the irreducible minimum level of
complexity necessary to capture the nuance of the law of fiduciary duty.
Thus, the law cannot be reduced adequately to two branches. A more
practical solution would be to say that there are five fiduciary duties. These
duties can be organized as follows":
TABLE. Five Paradigms for the Enforcement of Fiduciary Duties
FiduciaryDuty

Scope

Standardof Review

care

process

gross negligence

loyalty

conflicts

entire fairness

objectivity

bias

reasonableness

good faith

misconduct

intent

rationality

substance

waste

Of course, the specific taxonomy is not important. As long as it is
acknowledged that there are at least five different paradigms for
enforcement, it does not matter whether the law says that there are five
fiduciary duties, or three, or two, or even only one. Each statement has
10. A paradigm for enforcement is somewhat different from a standard of review. It is an
approach to judicial review and may comprise a number of related tests. These five paradigms are
described in detail in Part 11.
11. The labels care, loyalty, and good faith are familiar to corporate law. I have taken the liberty
of naming the two additional duties "objectivity" and "rationality."
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some truth to it. A statement that is true in one respect, however, may be
inadequate in other respects. Thus, the question-How many fiduciary
duties are there in corporate law?-is misleading and ultimately irrelevant.
My claim is not that there are five fiduciary duties, but rather that, if the
question must be asked, the best answer is five. Moreover, I maintain that it
is important to clarify the issue so that a simplistic structure does not lead
to the oversimplification of content.
In Part II, I detail the five paradigms for enforcement. In Part III, I
evaluate the Stone decision to rebifurcate fiduciary duties through the lens
of academic debate. I focus primarily on the exchange between Delaware
Vice Chancellor Leo Strine and Melvin Eisenberg. 12 This debate relies
heavily on semantic argumentation. After demonstrating that semantic
arguments do not support subsuming the duty of good faith within the duty
of loyalty, I conclude that determinations about the nature of fiduciary
duties should not turn on semantics. In Part IV, I set forth a new approach
for thinking about fiduciary duties. I begin with the concept of levels of
abstraction proposed by Claire Hill and Brett McDonnell, 3 but develop the
concept very differently. I argue that it is more meaningful and productive
to view fiduciary duties at the level of paradigms for enforcement than at
the more abstract level of potential for liability. I also demonstrate that
fiduciary duties are highly interrelated, such that there is significant overlap
among them. As a result, fiduciary duties cannot be said to lie on a single
linear continuum from which simple conclusions can be drawn. Finally, I
argue that the various fiduciary duties reflect different aspects of the one
fundamental fiduciary duty-to pursue the interests of the corporation and
its shareholders-and that, for purposes of litigation, a fiduciary duty
corresponds not to director conduct, but to the shareholders' concerns about
the conduct and the evidence they can offer. Thus, every action taken by a
12. See Melvin A. Eisenberg, The Duty of Good Faith in CorporateLaw, 31 DEL. J. CORP. L. 1
(2006); Leo E. Strine, Jr. et al., Loyalty's Core Demand: The Defining Role of Good Faith in
Corporation Law, 98 GEO. L.J. 629 (2010). For additional work on the duty of good faith, see, for
example, Stephen M. Bainbridge, Star Lopez & Benjamin Oklan, The Convergence of Good Faith and
Oversight, 55 UCLA L. REv. 559 (2008); Carter G. Bishop, DirectorialAbdication and the Taxonomic
Role of Good Faith in Delaware CorporateLaw, 2007 MICH. ST. L. REv. 905 (2007); Christopher M.
Bruner, Good Faith, State of Mind, and the Outer Boundaries of Director Liability in CorporateLaw,
41 WAKE FOREST L. REv. 1131 (2006); Elizabeth A. Nowicki, Not in Good Faith, 60 SMU L. REV. 441
(2007); David Rosenberg, Making Sense of Good Faith in Delaware Corporate Fiduciary Law: A
ContractarianApproach, 29 DEL. J. CORP. L. 491 (2004); Hillary A. Sale, Delaware's Good Faith, 89
CORNELL L. REv. 456 (2004); Hillary A. Sale, Monitoring Caremark's Good Faith,32 DEL. J. CORP. L.
719 (2007).
13. See Claire A. Hill & Brett H. McDonnell, Stone v. Ritter and the Expanding Duty of Loyalty,
76 FORDHAM L. REv. 1769, 1788-91 (2007).
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director implicates each fiduciary duty and can breach any or all of them
depending on the circumstances. Throughout Part IV, I am not advocating
for any change in law. Rather, I am merely seeking to develop a better
understanding of existing law. In Part V, I consider the impact of Cede &
Co.'s unified test for breach of fiduciary duty on my theory. I argue that my
theory can work well within that framework, but that it would be better for
Delaware to return to a more traditional model in which the various
standards of review are independent of each other. In this respect, I am
recommending a change in law. I conclude in Part VI.
II. THE FIVE PARADIGMS
The debate about the number of fiduciary duties in corporate law has
focused on whether there should be two duties or three. Currently, the
courts seem to favor bifurcation over a triadic formulation. Thus, a claim
that there may be five fiduciary duties would seem to be highly
problematic. I will begin laying the groundwork for the argument with a
claim that should be much less controversial. In this part, I will
demonstrate that there are at least five paradigms for the enforcement of
fiduciary duties. A paradigm for enforcement is somewhat different from a
standard of review. It is an approach to judicial review and may comprise a
number of related tests. There are more than five standards of review in
corporate law. Thus, it is possible to argue that there are more than five
paradigms for enforcement. I believe, however, that five represents the
irreducible minimum, and that it adequately reflects the richness and
nuance of existing law.
Sections A and B cover the two most familiar paradigms. The first is
the paradigm for review of the decisionmaking process, or the business
judgment rule. The second is the paradigm for review of conflicts of
interest, or the entire fairness test. Section C covers the third paradigm.
Issues of structural bias invoke a number of intermediate standards of
review that attempt to assess reasonableness. Section D covers the fourth
paradigm. The emerging duty of good faith employs an intentional
misconduct standard. Section E covers the fifth and final paradigm. The
substance of business decisions is reviewed under a waste standard.
Finally, Section F closes with a short discussion of the implications of
exculpation charter provisions to the discussion.
A. PROCESS (GROSS NEGLIGENCE)
The first paradigm covers what is normally meant by the duty of care:
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the decisionmaking process. 4 Under the duty of care, "directors of a
corporation in managing the corporate affairs are bound to use that amount
of care which ordinarily careful and prudent men would use in similar
circumstances." '1 5 More specifically, "directors have a duty to inform
themselves, prior to making a business decision, of all material information
reasonably available to them. Having become so informed, they must then
6
act with requisite care in the discharge of their duties."'
While this language adequately describes the duty of care, it does a
poor job of describing the first paradigm of enforcement. In order to
understand the enforcement of the duty of care, one must understand the
business judgment rule. The most common definition of the business
judgment rule is that it "is a presumption that in making a business decision
the directors of a corporation acted on an informed basis, in good faith and
in the honest belief that the action taken was in the best interests of the
company."' 17 The Delaware courts have explained:
The rule operates as both a procedural guide for litigants and a
substantive rule of law. As a rule of evidence, it creates a
presumption .... If the proponent [of a claim] fails to meet her burden
of establishing facts rebutting the presumption, the business judgment
rule, as a substantive rule18 of law, will attach to protect the directors and
the decisions they make.
This characterization of the business judgment rule is inadequate and
does more to confuse matters than to clarify them. In simpler terms, the
business judgment rule can be characterized as a standard of review that
corresponds to the duty of care.' 9 Confusingly, standards of review do not
always match standards of conduct in corporate law. 20 In Delaware, "under
14. 1 use the term "decisionmaking process" in the broadest sense possible. It includes the
process related to all board endeavors, whether in the nature of management or monitoring.
15. Graham ex rel. S'holders of Allis-Chalmers Mfg. Co. v. Allis-Chalmers Mfg. Co., 188 A.2d
125, 130 (Del. 1963). See also MODEL BUS. CORP. ACT § 8.30(b) (2005) ("The members of the board
of directors ... shall discharge their duties with the care that a person in a like position would
reasonably believe appropriate under similar circumstances.").
16. Aronson v. Lewis, 473 A.2d 805, 812 (Del. 1984), overruled on other grounds by Brehm v.
Eisner, 746 A.2d 244, 254 (Del. 2000).
17. Id.
18. Citron v. Fairchild Camera & Instrument Corp., 569 A.2d 53, 64 (Del. 1989) (internal
quotation marks omitted).
19. See Julian Velasco, StructuralBias and the Needfor Substantive Review, 82 WASH. U. L.Q.
821, 828-29 (2004). Cf Stephen M. Bainbridge, The Business Judgment Rule as Abstention Doctrine,
57 VAND. L. REV. 83, 89-90 (2004) (arguing that the business judgement rule is best understood as an
"abstention doctrine" that creates a presumption against duty of care claims).
20. See MODEL BUS. CORP. ACT § 8.31 official cmt.; Melvin Aron Eisenberg, The Divergence of

2010]

HOWMANYDUTIES?

1239

the business judgment rule director liability is predicated upon concepts of
gross negligence." 2 1 Thus, while the duty of care demands that directors
avoid negligence, the business judgment rule provides that directors will be
held accountable for breaching the duty of care only if they are grossly
negligent. Although the distinction between negligence and gross
negligence may be difficult to articulate, 22 gross negligence involves
conduct that is significantly more culpable than negligence; conduct that
can be characterized as extremely negligent, as opposed to barely
negligent.23
Thus, the first paradigm for the enforcement of fiduciary duties is that
the directors' decisionmaking process will be reviewed for gross
negligence. This is a deferential standard of review. The justification for
the laxity is multifaceted.24 It usually begins with the statutory mandate that
"[t]he business and affairs of every corporation... shall be managed by or
under the direction of a board of directors," 25 rather than by the
shareholders who would challenge their decisions or the courts who would
evaluate them. 26 It is also heavily grounded in the recognition that courts
lack the expertise to evaluate business decisions, given the infrequency
with which they are required to do so and the inherent bias of hindsight.2 7
Ultimately, however, it is based largely on the insight that, "as a general
matter, directors can be trusted and need not be policed very closely," 2 8 at
least unless there is some reason to doubt them.
B. CONFLICTS (FAIRNESS)

The second paradigm covers what is traditionally meant by the duty of
Standards of Conduct and Standards of Review in CorporateLaw, 62 FORDHAM L. REV. 437 (1993).
21.
Aronson, 473 A.2d at 812.
22.
See Edward Rock & Michael Wachter, DangerousLiaisons: CorporateLaw, Trust Law, and

InterdoctrinalLegal Transplants, 96 Nw. U. L. REv. 651, 658 n.56 (2002) ("It has long been debated
whether there is a difference between 'negligence' and 'gross negligence."').
23. See BLACK'S LAW DICTIONARY 1134 (9th ed. 2009) (defining "gross negligence").
24. For a more thorough discussion, see Velasco, supra note 19, at 830-34.
25.

DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 8, § 141 (a) (2010).

26. See Smith v. Van Gorkom, 488 A.2d 858, 872 (Del. 1985) ("The business judgment rule
exists to protect and promote the full and free exercise of the managerial power granted to Delaware
directors."), overruledon othergrounds by Gantler v. Stephens, 965 A.2d 695, 713 n.54 (Del. 2009).

27. See Joy v. North, 692 F.2d 880, 886 (2d Cir. 1982) ("[C]ourts recognize that after-the-fact
litigation is a most imperfect device to evaluate corporate business decisions."); Auerbach v. Bennett,
393 N.E.2d 994, 1000 (N.Y. 1979) ("[Tlhe business judgment doctrine, at least in part, is grounded in
the prudent recognition that courts are ill equipped and infrequently called on to evaluate what are and
must be essentially business judgments.").
28. Velasco, supranote 19, at 834.
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loyalty: conflicts of interest. "If the key insight of the business judgment
rule is that directors generally can be trusted, the key insight of the entire
fairness test is that this is not always so." 29 Guth v. Loft, Inc. is often cited
as providing the classic statement of the duty of loyalty:
Corporate officers and directors are not permitted to use their position
of trust and confidence to further their private interests. While
technically not trustees, they stand in a fiduciary relation to the
corporation and its stockholders. A public policy, existing through the
years, and derived from a profound knowledge of human characteristics
and motives, has established a rule that demands of a corporate officer or
director, peremptorily and inexorably, the most scrupulous observance of
his duty, not only affirmatively to protect the interests of the corporation
committed to his charge, but also to refrain from doing anything that
would work injury to the corporation, or to deprive it of profit or
advantage which his skill and ability might properly bring to it, or to
enable it to make in the reasonable and lawful exercise of its powers. The
rule that requires an undivided and unselfish loyalty to the corporation
demands that there shall be no conflict between duty and self-interest.
The occasions for the determination of honesty, good faith and loyal
be
conduct are many and varied, and no hard and fast rule can
30
scale.
fixed
no
by
measured
is
loyalty
of
standard
The
fonnulated.
Once again, this is more a description of the duty of loyalty than of the
second paradigm of enforcement. In order to understand the enforcement of
the duty of loyalty, one must understand the entire fairness test. At first
glance, the standard of review and the standard of conduct associated with
the duty of loyalty seem closely aligned. 3 ' Closer inspection, however,
reveals that there is a significant divergence in some respects.
Taken to its logical conclusion, the duty of loyalty could require that
directors never have any conflicts of interest. Essentially, that was once the
state of the law. 32 Over time, however, the law developed to the point
where it stands today: directors are allowed to engage in interested
transactions, provided that the transactions are sanitized by the approval of
either fully informed directors or shareholders ex ante, or the courts ex
29. Id.
30. Guth v. Loft, Inc., 5 A.2d 503, 510 (Del. 1939). For another classic statement, see Meinhard
v. Salmon, 164 N.E. 545, 546 (N.Y. 1928) (discussing the fiduciary duty of loyalty among partners).
31. See Eisenberg, supra note 20, at 451 (stating that "the standard of review is the same as the
standard of conduct").
32. See generally Harold Marsh, Jr., Are Directors Trustees? Conflict ofInterest and Corporate
Morality, 22 Bus. LAW. 35 (1966) (discussing the history of legal treatment of conflicts under duty of
loyalty).
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post.33 If a transaction is sanitized by director or shareholder approval, it
usually is found not to involve a conflict of interest and is reviewed under
the business judgment rule; otherwise, it is subject to scrutiny under the
34
entire fairness test.

The entire fairness test has both a procedural and a substantive
component. According to the Delaware Supreme Court:
The concept of fairness has two basic aspects: fair dealing and fair price.
The former embraces questions of when the transaction was timed, how
it was initiated, structured, negotiated, disclosed to the directors, and
how the approvals of the directors and the stockholders were obtained.
The latter aspect of fairness relates to the economic and financial
considerations of the proposed [transaction], including all relevant
factors: assets, market value, earnings, future prospects, and any other
elements that affect the intrinsic or inherent value of a company's
stock.... However, the test for fairness is not a bifurcated one as
between fair dealing and price. All aspects of the issue35must be examined
as a whole since the question is one of entire fairness.
The deference that is the hallmark of the business judgment rule is
entirely absent under the entire fairness test. Not only do directors bear the
burden of proof, but they also must justify both their decisionmaking
process and the substance of their decisions. It would seem that the
business judgment rule and the entire fairness test could not be much more
33. See DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 8, § 144 (2010); MODEL BUS. CORP. ACT § 8.61 (2005); Fliegler v.
Lawrence, 361 A.2d 218, 222 (Del. 1976) ("We do not read the statute as providing ... broad
immunity .... It merely removes an 'interested director' cloud when its terms are met .... Nothing in
the statute sanctions unfairness ... or removes the transaction from judicial scrutiny.").
34. See, e.g., Marciano v. Nakash, 535 A.2d 400, 405 n.3 (Del. 1987) ("[A]pproval by fullyinformed disinterested directors under section 144(a)(1), or disinterested stockholders under section
144(a)(2), permits invocation of the business judgment rule and limits judicial review to issues of gift or
waste with the burden of proof upon the party attacking the transaction."); In re The Walt Disney Co.
Derivative Litig., 731 A.2d 342, 368 (Del. Ch. 1998) ("[O]ur courts have treated fully informed
shareholder ratification under § 144(a)(2) as validating the transaction and removing it from the
purview of entire fairness review. The business judgment rule applies to the ratified transaction ...
(footnote omitted)), aff'd in part, rev'd in partsub nom. Brehm v. Eisner, 746 A.2d 244 (Del. 2000).
To be fair, there is an additional layer of complexity when a controlling shareholder is involved
See Kahn v. Lynch Commc'n Sys., Inc., 638 A.2d 1110, 1117 (Del. 1994) ("[A]n approval of the
transaction by an independent committee of directors or an informed majority of minority shareholders
shifts the burden of proof on the issue of fairness .... "). I have not included this in the discussion in the
text for two reasons. First, although it complicates the discussion, it does not change much. As I have
made clear, a paradigm for enforcement can include multiple standards of review. Second, I believe the
situation involves structural bias-type concerns and might be better placed in the third paradigm for
enforcement. See Velasco, supranote 19, at 851-53.
35. Weinberger v. UOP, Inc., 457 A.2d 701, 711 (Del. 1983) (citations omitted).
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divergent. In fact, it has been said that "the determination of the appropriate
36
standard of judicial review frequently is determinative of the outcome."
And yet, the entire fairness test is not quite as demanding as could be
imagined. It is not actually outcome-determinative. 37 Nor does the test
require the directors to prove that their decision was perfect. 38 Moreover,
the test has only limited applicability. Despite the broad language with
which the courts often describe the duty of loyalty, the entire fairness test is
not applied to all director conflicts. It is only applied to those that "rise to
the level of self-dealing." 39 "Classic examples of [self-dealing] involve
either a director appearing on both sides of a transaction or a director
receiving a personal benefit from a transaction not received by the
40
shareholders generally."
Actual self-dealing is not necessarily required, provided that the
conflict rises to the same level substantively. However, many types of
conflict that a layperson might think would compromise a director's
objectivity are not deemed to rise to the level of self-dealing. The most
obvious is friendship and collegiality among the directors on a board.4 ' The
42
courts have rejected such claims even in extreme circumstances.
36. Mills Acquisition Co. v. Macmillan, Inc., 559 A.2d 1261, 1279 (Del. 1989) (quoting AC
Acquisitions Corp. v. Anderson, Clayton & Co., 519 A.2d 103, 111 (Del. Ch. 1986)).
37. See Cinerama, Inc. v. Technicolor, Inc., 663 A.2d 1156, 1163 (Del. 1995) ("[A]n initial
judicial determination that a given breach of a board's fiduciary duties has rebutted the presumption of
the business judgment rule does not preclude a subsequent judicial determination that the board action
was entirely fair, and is, therefore, not outcome-determinative per se."); Nixon v. Blackwell, 626 A.2d
1366, 1376 (Del. 1993) ("Application of the entire fairness rule does not, however, always implicate
liability of the conflicted corporate decisionmaker, nor does it necessarily render the decision void.").
38. See Cinerama,663 A.2d at 1179 ("A finding of perfection is not a sine qua non in an entire
fairness analysis."); Weinberger, 457 A.2d at 709 n.7 (stating that "perfection is not possible, or
expected").
39. Cede & Co. v. Technicolor, Inc., 634 A.2d 345, 363 (Del. 1993) (citing Aronson v. Lewis,
473 A.2d 805, 812 (Del. 1984), overruled on other grounds by Brehm v. Eisner, 746 A.2d 244, 254
(Del. 2000)). See also Sinclair Oil Corp. v. Levien, 280 A.2d 717, 720 (Del. 1971) ("A parent does
indeed owe a fiduciary duty to its subsidiary when there are parent-subsidiary dealings. This alone will
not evoke the intrinsic fairness standard, however. This standard will be applied only when the fiduciary
duty is accompanied by self-dealing ....
").
40. Cede & Co., 634 A.2d at 362. See also Sinclair,280 A.2d at 720 ("The basic situation for the
application of the rule is the one in which the parent has received a benefit to the exclusion and at the
expense of the subsidiary.").
41. This is a species of structural bias. See Velasco, supra note 19, at 856-57.
42. In Beam ex rel. MarthaStewart Living Omnimedia, Inc. v. Stewart, the Delaware Supreme
Court considered the issue in the context of a demand futility claim and stated the following:
A variety of motivations, including friendship, may influence the demand futility inquiry.
But, to render a director unable to consider demand, a relationship must be of a biasproducing nature.... Not all friendships, or even most of them, rise to this level and the
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Generally, to be cognizable, a conflict must consist of either a personal or
familial financial interest. Even so, not all financial conflicts will be
invoke the entire fairness test. The conflict must be
sufficient 4to
"material." 3 A hypothetical or speculative conflict is insufficient. Even a
director's interest in maintaining his position on the board in the face of a
hostile takeover may not be sufficient."
A comparison of the standard of conduct and the standard of review
for the duty of loyalty reveals that there is significant congruence as well as
significant divergence. The standard of conduct is uniformly demanding;
the standard of review is not. On the one hand, the standard of review is
significantly more limited than the standard of conduct in that it focuses
primarily, if not exclusively, on financial conflicts that rise to the level of
self-dealing.4 5 On the other hand, once this hurdle is cleared, the standard
of review is quite exacting in that it requires the directors to carry the
burden of proof on the issue of fairness. In other words, the shareholders do
not have to prove any actual wrongdoing, but only a cognizable conflict of
interest, and then the directors must prove that they have done nothing
wrong.

46

Court cannot make a reasonableinference that a particular friendship does so without specific
factual allegations to support such a conclusion.
Beam ex rel. Martha Stewart Living Omnimedia, Inc. v. Stewart, 845 A.2d 1040, 1050 (Del. 2004)
(quoting Beam ex rel. Martha Stewart Living Omnimedia, Inc. v. Stewart, 833 A.2d 961, 979 (Del. Ch.
2003) (footnote omitted)). The facts of the case demonstrate that the quantum of proof required by the
court is quite high:
Allegations that Stewart and the other directors moved in the same social circles, attended the
same weddings, developed business relationships before joining the board, and described each
other as 'friends,' even when coupled with Stewart's 94% voting power, are insufficient,
without more, to rebut the presumption of independence. They do not provide a sufficient
basis from which reasonably to infer that [the directors in question] may have been beholden
to Stewart.
Id. at 1051. On the other hand, the courts have at times accepted claims of bias in much more
marginal situations. See, e.g., In re Oracle Corp. Derivative Litig., 824 A.2d 917, 920-21 (Del. Ch.
2003) (denying a special litigation committee's motion to terminate a derivative lawsuit because
members of the special litigation committee-two tenured professors at Stanford University-were
required to evaluate the conduct of a fellow professor and two University benefactors).
43. See Cede & Co., 634 A.2d at 364 ("A trial court must have flexibility in determining whether
an officer's or director's interest in a challenged board-approved transaction is sufficiently material to
find the director to have breached his duty of loyalty and to have infected the board's decision.").
44. See Am. Gen. Corp. v. Unitrin, Inc. (In re Unitrin, Inc. S'holders Litig.), Nos. 13656, 13699,
1994 Del. Ch. LEXIS 187, at *13 (Del. Ch. Oct. 13, 1994) ("The board's interest in employing these
defensive measures to deflect [a hostile] offer does not rise to the level of a self-dealing transaction that
requires the board to demonstrate entire fairness."), rev'd on other grounds, 651 A.2d 1361 (Del. 1995);
City Capital Assocs. Ltd. P'ship v. Interco Inc., 551 A.2d 787, 790 n.1 (Del. Ch. 1988).
45. This is an issue of some debate. See infra notes 152-56 and accompanying text. The second
paradigm of judicial enforcement, as I see it, deals almost exclusively with financial conflicts.
46. See Velasco, supra note 19, at 835.
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Thus, the second paradigm for the enforcement of fiduciary duties is
that directors are required to defend their actions whenever there is a
conflict that rises to the level of self-dealing. This is a demanding standard
of review that is reserved for special circumstances. The justification is that
when directors are conflicted they cannot be trusted to pursue the interests
of the shareholders over their own.47 The problem is that, even assuming
that the directors would not be dishonest by consciously favoring their own
interests, there may be situations when they are unable to pursue
shareholder interests as zealously as the shareholders deserve. For this
48
reason the courts provide shareholders with an impartial review.
C. BIAS (REASONABLENESS)
The third paradigm comprises a number of different standards of
review that deal with essentially the same problem: structural bias.
The term "structural bias" generally refers to the prejudice that members
of the board of directors may have in favor of one another and of
management. It is said to be the result of the "common cultural bond"
and "natural empathy and collegiality" shared by most directors, the
"economic[] or psychological[] dependen[cy] upon or tie[s] to the
corporation's executives, particularly its chief executive," and the
"process of director selection and socialization, which incumbent
' 9
management dominates. A
47. See 2 MODEL Bus. CORP. ACT § 8.60 Subchapter F, introductory cmt., at 8-372 (2002) ("The
law regulates interest-conflict transactions because experience shows that people do often yield to the
temptation to advance their self-interests and, if they do, other people may be injured. That contingent
fear is sufficient reason to warrant caution and to apply special standards and procedures to interestconflict transactions."); FRANKLIN A. GEVURTZ, CORPORATION LAW 325 (2000) ("[T]he fundamental
problem with conflict-of-interest transactions is that we do not trust individuals with a personal
financial stake at odds with the corporation's to put the corporation's interest ahead of their own.");
Gottlieb v. Heyden Chem. Corp., 90 A.2d 660, 663 (Del. 1952) ("Human nature being what it is, the
law, in its wisdom, does not presume that directors will be competent judges of the fair treatment of
their company where fairness must be at their own personal expense.").
48. See Nixon v. Blackwell, 626 A.2d 1366, 1376 (Del. 1993) ("The entire fairness analysis
essentially requires 'judicial scrutiny.' In business judgment rule cases, an essential element is the fact
that there has been a business decision made by a disinterested and independent corporate
decisionmaker. When there is no independent corporate decisionmaker, the court may become the
objective arbiter." (citations omitted) (footnote omitted)); AC Acquisitions Corp. v. Anderson, Clayton
& Co., 519 A.2d 103, 111 (Del. Ch. 1986) ("[W]hen a transaction is one involving a predominately
interested board with a financial interest in the transaction adverse to the corporation... there is no
alternative to a judicial evaluation of the fairness of the terms of the transaction other than the
unacceptable one of leaving shareholders unprotected.").
49. Velasco, supra note 19, at 824 (footnotes omitted) (quoting James D. Cox, Searchingfor the
Corporation'sVoice in DerivativeLitigation:A CritiqueofZapata and the ALI Project, 1982 DuKE L.J.
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Structural bias is a form of conflict, but not one that courts deem
cognizable under the duty of loyalty.5 ° This is understandable: "[I]f
structural bias were accepted as a conflict of interest,.., many issues that
are deemed to involve the duty of care might be considered to involve the
duty of loyalty. If so, the entire fairness test would swamp the business
judgment rule."5 1 This would be inappropriate. Nevertheless, the concern
that structural bias affects the independence of directors is legitimate and,
as
as a result, "the deference of the business judgment rule seems
52
inadequate as the rigor of the entire fairness test seems excessive."
Despite sometimes being resistant to, or even dismissive of, claims of
structural bias,5 3 the Delaware courts have dealt with the problem in a
number of different circumstances.5 4 They have done so by developing
intermediate standards of review when neither the business judgment rule
nor the entire fairness test seemed appropriate. The two most significant
circumstances the courts have addressed are takeover defense and board
review of shareholder derivative litigation. 55
959, 962; MELVIN A. EISENBERG, THE STRUCTURE OF THE CORPORATION: A LEGAL ANALYSIS 145

(1976); and John C. Coffee, Jr. & Donald E. Schwartz, The Survival of the Derivative Suit: An
Evaluation and a Proposalfor Legislative Reform, 81 COLUM. L. REv. 261, 283 (1981) (alterations in
original)). See also Claire A. Hill & Brett H. McDonnell, Disney, Good Faith, and StructuralBias, 32
J. CORP. L. 833, 853-54 (2007).
50. See Velasco, supra note 19, at 914 ("[A]lthough structural bias may seem to involve the duty
of loyalty, it does not necessarily involve a breach of the duty of loyalty."). Perhaps it would be more
accurate to say that structural bias does not fall within the second paradigm for enforcement of fiduciary
duties. Delaware courts allow for the possibility that friendship might, in an appropriate case,
undermine a director's independence. In their view, however, that would be a rare case. See cases cited
supra note 42. Courts demand specific proof. See Beam ex rel. Martha Stewart Living Omnimedia, Inc.
v. Stewart, 845 A.2d 1040, 1051-52 (Del. 2004) ("Mere allegations that they move in the same business
and social circles, or a characterization that they are close friends, is not enough to negate
independence .... ); Aronson v. Lewis, 473 A.2d 805, 815 n.8 (Del. 1984) ("The difficulty with
structural bias ... is simply one of establishing it in the complaint ....

We are satisfied that

discretionary review by the Court of Chancery of complaints alleging specific facts pointing to bias on a
particular board will be sufficient ... "), overruled on other grounds by Brehm v. Eisner, 746 A.2d
244, 254 (Del. 2000). This language is inconsistent with the structural bias claim that, in such
relationships, bias is inherent. Because structural bias is by definition a subtle influence, the
requirement that the shareholders provide proof is essentially a rejection of the argument. In any event,
the requirement that shareholders bear such a heavy burden of proof is incompatible with the second
paradigm that places the burden of proof on the directors.
51.
Velasco, supra note 19, at 844-45.
52. Id. at 840.
53. Id. at 841-45.
54. See id. at 845-52.
55. A third possibility would be conflicts of interest when a controlling shareholder is involved.
See supra note 34.
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In Unocal Corp. v. Mesa Petroleum Co., the court recognized that, in
circumstances involving a hostile takeover, there is an "omnipresent
specter that a board may be acting primarily in its own interests, rather than
those of the corporation and its shareholders." 5 6 In response, the court
recognized "an enhanced duty which calls for judicial examination at the
threshold before the protections of the business judgment rule may be
conferred." 57 That threshold inquiry was a new intermediate standard of
review. First, "directors must show that they had reasonable grounds for
believing that a danger to corporate policy and effectiveness existed." 58
Second, the defensive measures "must be reasonable in relation to the
threat posed." 59 At the time, this seemed to be a reasonable attempt to
balance the various competing concerns. Unfortunately, subsequent
developments have demonstrated that the Unocal test is not as demanding
as its language might suggest, and I have argued elsewhere 60that it now
provides little more protection than the business judgment rule.
In Zapata Corp. v. Maldonado, the court recognized that, in situations
where a board of directors decides to oppose derivative litigation, "there is
sufficient risk in the realities of [the] situation ... to justify caution beyond
the adherence to the theory of business judgment."'" In response, the
Delaware Supreme Court reserved the right to reject a board or
committee's decision if the circumstances warrant. 62 Again, the court did
so in the form of a new, two-part test. "First, the Court should inquire into
the independence and good faith of the committee and the bases supporting
its conclusions.... The corporation should have the burden of
56. Unocal Corp. v. Mesa Petroleum Co., 493 A.2d 946, 954 (Del. 1985).
57. Id.
58. Id. at 955.
59. Id.
60. See Velasco, supra note 9, at 416-22; Velasco, supra note 19, at 846-47.
61.
Zapata Corp. v. Maldonado, 430 A.2d 779, 787 (Del. 1981). In particular:
[W]e must be mindful that directors are passing judgment on fellow directors in the same
corporation and fellow directors, in this instance, who designated them to serve both as
directors and committee members. The question naturally arises whether a "there but for the
grace of God go I" empathy might not play a role. And the further question arises whether
inquiry as to independence, good faith and reasonable investigation is sufficient safeguard
against abuse, perhaps subconscious abuse.
Id.
62. Id. at 788. The court justified its decision on the following basis:
We recognize the danger of judicial overreaching but the alternatives seem to us to be
outweighed by the fresh view of a judicial outsider. Moreover, if we failed to balance all the
interests involved, we would in the name of practicality and judicial economy foreclose a
judicial decision on the merits. At this point, we are not convinced that is necessary or
desirable.
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pro[of] .... 63 Second, "The Court should determine, applying its own
independent business judgment, whether the motion should be granted."'64
This result is somewhat out of place in corporate law, where judicial
incompetence to make business decisions is one of the key justifications of
the business judgment rule.6 5 Nevertheless, this reserved power to overrule
directors' -decisions based entirely on the courts' own assessment of the
merits has not had much of an impact on litigation.66
These are the two main intermediate standards of review. Others could
be identified.6 7 Unfortunately, Delaware has dealt with these problems in
an ad hoc manner. In earlier work, I have argued that a common approach
to the problem of structural bias would be preferable. 68 My proposal called
for a moderate review of the substance of directors' decisions: in cases
involving structural bias, the shareholders would be able to prevail by
establishing that the directors' decisions were unreasonable. 69 This
reasonableness standard may seem reminiscent of the Unocal standard, but
actually is quite different:
Aware of structural bias, the courts should not be overly concerned with
substituting their own business judgment for that of conflicted directors.
They should, with confidence, determine whether the decision in
question was unreasonable under the circumstances. The only deference
63. Id.
64. Id. at 789.
65. See supranote 27 and accompanying text.
66. See GEVURTZ, supranote 47, at 434 ("The fact that there have been no reported major trials
to apply the Zapata approach raises questions as to whether courts or litigants ever will be serious about
obtaining an independent judicial evaluation of the corporation's interest.").
67. See, e.g., Revlon, Inc. v. MacAndrews & Forbes Holdings, Inc., 506 A.2d 173, 182 (Del.
1986) ("[When] the break-up of the company [becomes] inevitable... [t]he directors' role change[s]
from defenders of the corporate bastion to auctioneers charged with getting the best price for the
stockholders at a sale of the company."); Aronson v. Lewis, 473 A.2d 805, 814 (Del. 1984) (holding
that the test for demand futility involves "two inquiries, one into the independence and disinterestedness
of the directors and the other into the substantive nature of the challenged transaction and the board's
approval thereof'), overruled on other grounds by Brehm v. Eisner, 746 A.2d 244, 254 (Del. 2000);
Blasius Indus., Inc. v. Atlas Corp., 564 A.2d 651, 659-61 (Del. Ch. 1988) (noting that "a decision by
the board to act for the primary purpose of preventing the effectiveness of a shareholder vote" requires
that the board "bear[] the heavy burden of demonstrating a compelling justification for such action");
Velasco, supra note 19, at 851-53 (characterizing shifts in the burden of proof on the issue of fairness
as an intermediate standard of review). Cf. Velasco, supra note 19, at 847-49 n. I1I (discussing whether
Revlon and Blasius should be seen as separate tests, or as part of Unocal).
68. See generally Velasco, supra note 19 (proposing an intermediate standard of review for cases
involving structural bias that would balance directorial authority and accountability).
69. Id. at 876. Under my proposed standard, a reasonable decision would be "one that a prudent
and impartial decision maker could realistically-as opposed to merely hypothetically--consider wise."
Id. at 877.
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that courts should show would come from the breadth of the term
"reasonable"-which is significant, but not boundless. The extreme
to directors under the
deference that would normally be afforded
70
business judgment rule should not apply.
As I have argued, such a standard would "strike a balance between the
deference of the business judgment rule and the rigor of the entire fairness
test ' 71 by providing judicial review that is "meaningful, but not
excessive.

' 72

Clearly, the third paradigm of enforcement of fiduciary duties is less
well defined than the first two. Nevertheless, a general outline is
discemable. Under the Unocal test, a court reviews the merits of the
board's decisions for reasonableness and proportionality (even if the review
is deferential). Under the Zapata test, a court may reject the board's
decision based entirely on its own business judgment. In other words, the
third paradigm provides that, in a situation involving a recognized risk of
in
structural bias, the courts will apply an intermediate standard of review
73
which the substance of the directors' decision is not beyond scrutiny.
In this Article, I refer to the third paradigm as a test of
"reasonableness" for three reasons. First, although there is no single
intermediate standard of review, it is grammatically easier to speak as if
there were. Second, the term reasonableness conveys a moderate review of
substance, which the various standards share. Third, the term
reasonableness can easily refer to either the Unocal test or my proposed
intermediate standard of review. In any event, the approach to fiduciary
duties that I propose in this Article works well regardless of the precise
contours of the third paradigm.
D. MISCONDUCT (INTENT)

The fourth paradigm covers what is normally meant by the duty of
good faith: intentional misconduct.7 4 The law not only presumes, but also
requires, that directors act in good faith.75 Various statutory provisions
70.
71.
72.
73.
74.
75.
8, § 145

Id. at 880.
Id. at 826.
Id. at 871.
See id. at 845-53.
I defend this claim infra notes 78-86 and accompanying text.
See, e.g., Bainbridge, Lopez & Oklan, supra note 12, at 563-64 (citing DEL. CODE ANN. tit.
(2001)); Eisenberg, supra note 12, at 4.
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reflect the importance of good faith in corporation law. 76 For over a decade,
the duty of good faith was elevated to a position of equality with duties of
care and loyalty in Delaware law. 77 Nevertheless, the duty of good faith has
not received much attention until fairly recently.
While it is difficult to pin down the duty of good faith with certainty,
Eisenberg has articulated an excellent formulation:
The duty of good faith in corporate law is comprised of a general
baseline conception and specific obligations that instantiate that
conception. The baseline conception consists of four elements:
subjective honesty, or sincerity; nonviolation of generally accepted
standards of decency applicable to the conduct of business; nonviolation
of generally accepted basic corporate norms; and fidelity to office.
Among the specific obligations that instantiate the baseline conception
are the obligation not to knowingly cause the corporation to disobey78the
law and the obligation of candor even in non-self-interested contexts.
Although one may quibble at the margins, this description captures the
essence of the duty of good faith.
One of the leading cases on the issue of good faith is the Disney
There, the Delaware Supreme Court elaborated on the duty of good
faith as follows:
A failure to act in good faith may be shown, for instance, where the
fiduciary intentionally acts with a purpose other than that of advancing
the best interests of the corporation, where the fiduciary acts with the
intent to violate applicable positive law, or where the fiduciary
intentionally fails to act in the face of a known duty to act, demonstrating
a conscious disregard for his duties. There may be other examples of80bad
faith yet to be proven or alleged, but these three are the most salient.
case. 79

This account comes closer to describing the standard of review than the
standard of conduct. It is much narrower than Eisenberg's standard.
Essentially, it provides that shareholders may establish a breach of the duty
of good faith by showing intentional misconduct, intentional violation of
76. See, e.g., DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 8, §§ 102(b)(7), 141(e), 144, 145(a)-(b) (2010).
77. Good faith was declared to be part of a triad of fiduciary duties in Cede & Co. v.
Technicolor, Inc., 634 A.2d 345, 361 (Del. 1993). It was demoted to a subset of loyalty in Stone ex rel.
AmSouth Bancorporationv. Ritter, 911 A.2d 362, 369-70 (Del. 2006).
78. See Eisenberg, supra note 12, at 5.
79. In re The Walt Disney Co. Derivative Litig., 906 A.2d 27 (Del. 2006). The other is Stone,
911 A.2d 362.
80. Disney, 906 A.2d at 67 (quoting In re The Walt Disney Co. Derivative Litig., 907 A.2d 693,
755-56 (Del. Ch. 2005), affid, 906 A.2d 27); quoted in Stone, 911 A.2d at 369.
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law, or intentional disregard of duty.
All three of the violations of the duty of good faith identified by the
Disney court, as well as dishonesty, insincerity, indecency, and infidelity, 81
can be categorized generally as "intentional misconduct," which is the core
concern of the fourth paradigm. A breach of the duty of good faith involves
conduct that is both intentional and wrongful. There need not be any malice
or intent on the part of the director to cause harm, however. As long as
there is intentional behavior that the law considers to be misconduct, there
is a breach of fiduciary duty. In other words, there is an objective
component to good faith.82 Of course, a subjective intent to harm
shareholder interests would suffice; but so would a simple intent to violate
the law (even if it were motivated by a desire to benefit the shareholders) as
well as intent to shirk responsibility, among other things.
I would argue that, under the fourth paradigm, the shareholders also
can establish a breach of fiduciary duty by proving that the directors
intentionally violated the standard of conduct for either the duty of care or
the duty of loyalty (or any other duty, for that matter). This is important
because of the divergence between standards of conduct and standards of
review in corporate law. 8 3 The standard of conduct for the duty of loyalty
may require that directors act only in the interests of the corporation and its
shareholders, but (under the second paradigm) the standard of review
covers primarily financial conflicts that rise to the level of self-dealing.
However, if the shareholders can establish that the directors actually
pursued an interest other than those of the corporation and its shareholders
(whatever that may be, and whether or not the conflict is financial or rises
to the level of self-dealing), that would be actionable under the fourth
paradigm. Likewise, the standard of conduct for the duty of care requires
that each director act as an ordinarily careful and prudent person in similar
circumstances, but the standard of review requires the shareholders to
prove that the directors were grossly negligent-and even then, the
directors might be exculpated. 84 However, if the shareholders could
establish that directors acted recklessly-that is, with a "conscious ([or]
81. See supra note 78 and accompanying text.
82. Strine insists that good faith is entirely subjective: it is "the state of mind that must motivate
a loyal fiduciary." Strine etal., supra note 12, at 633. Many scholars disagree. See, e.g., Eisenberg,
supra note 12, at 23 ("[G]ood faith in law includes objective as well as subjective elements."); Nowicki,
supra note 12, at 469.
83. See supranote 20 and accompanying text.
84. See infra Part II.F (discussing statutory exculpation of a director's breach of the fiduciary
duty of care).
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deliberate) disregard for or indifference to ['a substantial and unjustifiable']
risk" 8 5-that would be actionable under the fourth paradigm.8 6
What happens if the shareholders can establish intentional
87
misconduct? Presumably, an entire fairness inquiry would follow,
although that is not entirely free from doubt.88 I propose that the burden
should shift to the directors to establish a compelling justification for their
actions. Readers familiar with Blasius Industries,Inc. v. Atlas Corp. will no
doubt notice a resemblance with the test announced in that case. 89 This is
intentional. I believe that the Blasius case, at root, involves the duty of
good faith rather than care or loyalty.9"
In Blasius, a 9 percent shareholder sought to expand the board of
directors of the company from seven to fifteen members and to name eight
new directors. In response, the existing directors quickly expanded the size
of the board to nine members and appointed two new directors. This was
done in order to prevent that shareholder from naming a majority of
directors.9 1 The court held that whenever directors act for the primary
purpose of thwarting a shareholder vote, their actions cannot be upheld
without a compelling justification. 92 This is because such action by the
board of directors intrudes on the shareholders' right in corporate
93
governance to elect directors.
The directors' actions in Blasius constituted intentional misconduct.
The conduct (appointing new directors) was both intentional (primary
purpose) and wrongful (thwarting a shareholder vote).94 The court believed
85.
BLACK'S LAW DICTIONARY 1385 (9th ed. 2009) (defining "reckless").
86. If this is correct, then an intentional breach of the duty of care would not be exculpable
because it also would be a breach of the duty of good faith. See infra notes 322-25 and accompanying
text.
87. See In re The Walt Disney Co. Derivative Litig., 906 A.2d 27, 52 (Del. 2006).
88. See infra notes 326-30 and accompanying text.
89. Blasius Indus., Inc. v. Atlas Corp., 564 A.2d 651, 663 (Del. Ch. 1988). The essential holding
of Blasius has been affirmed by the Delaware Supreme Court. See MM Cos., Inc. v. Liquid Audio, Inc.,
813 A.2d 1118, 1132 (Del. 2003) ("When the primary purpose of a board of directors' defensive
measure is to interfere with or impede the effective exercise of the shareholder franchise in a contested
election for directors, the board must first demonstrate a compelling justification for such action as a
condition precedent to any judicial consideration of reasonableness and proportionately [sic].").
90. The same point has been made by Andrew Gold. See Andrew S.Gold, The New Concept of
Loyalty in CorporateLaw, 43 U.C. DAVIS L. REV. 457, 480-83 (2009).
91.
Blasius, 564 A.2d at 654-56.
92. Id.
at 661-62.
93.
ld. at 659-60.
94. In earlier work, I have argued that the Blasius test should be extended to cover any director
action that has "a significant effect of interference with shareholder democracy." Julian Velasco, Taking
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that the directors were acting in subjective good faith (that is, in order to
protect the remaining shareholders). 95 Nevertheless, the conduct was
inherently wrongful under corporate law given the structure of corporate
governance. Rather than rule their behavior illegal per se, however, the
court gave the directors the opportunity to prove that they were acting in
the best interests of the corporation and its shareholders by establishing a
compelling justification for their actions. This is no intermediate standard
of review. Unlike the third paradigm, shareholders bear a very heavy
burden. Moreover, if they meet this burden, the directors bear an even
heavier burden to escape liability. This, I believe, is the essence of the
fourth paradigm for enforcement-or at least should be.
Thus, the fourth paradigm for the enforcement of fiduciary duties is
that the directors will be held accountable for intentional misconduct. It is
important to note that the primary burden of proof is on the shareholders,
and it is a heavy one. Although malice is not necessary, the shareholders
must establish intentional conduct that is wrongful. Once they have done
so, the burden shifts to the directors to justify their actions. Because their
actions constitute misconduct, the directors should have to establish a
96
compelling justification.
As a final matter, it is worth noting how different the fourth paradigm
is from the second. The second paradigm is based on the duty of loyalty
and focuses on financial conflicts that rise to the level of self-dealing.
Under it, the real burden is on the directors to establish that their behavior
was entirely fair to the shareholders. The fourth paradigm is based on the
duty of good faith and focuses on intentional misconduct. Under it, the
shareholders bear the primary burden of establishing that the directors
engaged in intentional misconduct. As standards of review, the two are
entirely different.
E.

SUBSTANCE (WASTE)

The fifth and final paradigm deals with the substance of business
decisions and covers a range of legal concepts, including abuse of
ShareholderRights Seriously, 41 U.C. DAVIS L. REv. 605, 658 (2007). 1 believe that this is consistent
with an intentional misconduct test, provided that the shareholders can establish that the directors
intentionally took action knowing that significant interference with the shareholder franchise would
result.

95.
96.

Blasius, 564 A.2d at 658.
Cf infra notes 336-39 and accompanying text.
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discretion, waste, irrationality, and (more recently) substantive care.97 This
paradigm is the most controversial.
One of the most respected jurists in Delaware's history, Chancellor
William Allen, took a very strong negative position on the issue in In re
CaremarkInternational,Inc. DerivativeLitigation.9 8 According to him,
[C]ompliance with a director's duty of care can never appropriately be
judicially determined by reference to the content of the board decision

that leads to a corporate loss, apart from consideration of the good faith
or rationality of the process employed. That is, whether a judge or jury
considering the matter after the fact, believes a decision substantively
wrong, or degrees of wrong extending through "stupid" to "egregious" or
"irrational", provides no ground for director liability, so long as the court
determines that the process employed was either 99
rational or employed in
a goodfaith effort to advance corporate interests.
This position is understandable. The rationale for limited judicial review
under the business judgment rule applies with even greater force to the
00
substance of business decisions than to the decisionmaking process.'
Many scholars believe that the courts should not review the substance of
business decisions absent some other breach of fiduciary duty.' 0 1
Nevertheless, the fact remains that courts generally do reserve the
right to review the substance of business decisions, at least in the most
extreme cases. 10 2 For example, in Brehm v. Eisner, the Delaware Supreme
Court took a very negative position on the issue, but did not reject it
altogether:
As for the plaintiffs' contention that the directors failed to exercise
"substantive due care," we should note that such a concept is foreign to
the business judgment rule. Courts do not measure, weigh or quantify
97. See DENNIS J. BLOCK, NANCY E. BARTON & STEPHEN A. RADIN, THE BUSINESS JUDGMENT
RULE: FIDUCIARY DUTIES OF CORPORATE DIRECTORS 84-90, 93-97 (5th ed. 1998) (discussing abuse of
discretion and waste); Brehm v. Eisner, 746 A.2d 244, 262-66 (Del. 2000) (discussing "substantive due
care" and waste).
98. In re Caremark Int'l Inc. Derivative Litig., 698 A.2d 959 (Del. Ch. 1996) (Allen, C.).
99. Id at 967.
100. See supra notes 19-27 and accompanying text.
101. See, e.g., Bainbridge, supra note 19, at 90; Andrew S. Gold, A Decision Theory Approach to
the Business Judgment Rule: Reflections on Disney, Good Faith, and Judicial Uncertainty, 66 MD. L.
REv. 398, 401 (2007); Lyman Johnson, The Modest Business Judgment Rule, 55 BUs. LAW. 625, 63132 (2000); D.A. Jeremy Telman, The Business Judgment Rule, Disclosure, and Executive
Compensation, 81 TUL. L. REv. 829, 830-33 (2007); E. Norman Veasey & Christine T. Di Guglielmo,
What Happened in Delaware Corporate Law and Governance From 1992-2004? A Retrospective on
Some Key Developments, 153 U. PA. L. REv. 1399, 1421-24 (2005).
102. See BLOCK, BARTON & RADIN, supra note 97, at 84-90, 93-97.
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directors' judgments. We do not even decide if they are reasonable in
this context. Due care in the decisionmaking context is process due care
only. Irrationality is the outer limit of the business judgment rule.
Irrationality may be the functional equivalent of the waste test or it may
tend to show that the decision is not made
in good faith, which is a key
03
ingredient of the business judgment rule.1

It seems that the courts are unable or unwilling to let go of the
concept.'0 4 This should not provide much comfort to shareholders,
however. To establish a breach of fiduciary duty under the fifth paradigm,
the shareholders bear the burden of establishing that "[the consideration]
the corporation has received is so inadequate in value that no person of
ordinary, sound business judgment would deem it worth that which the
corporation has paid.'' °5 "That is 'an extreme test, very rarely satisfied by a
shareholder plaintiff.""l0 6
In light of the foregoing, one has to wonder whether there is any point
in having a fifth paradigm. Perhaps it is nothing more than a "theoretical
exception."' 0 7 After all, it seems fanciful to suggest that a careful,
unconflicted, and unbiased board of directors acting in good faith could
come to a decision that no reasonable person could reach.
The fifth paradigm is not merely tilting at windmills, however. It does
103. Brehm v. Eisner, 746 A.2d 244, 264 (Del. 2000) (footnotes omitted). The court also stated
that "[t]o be sure, there are outer limits, but they are confined to unconscionable cases where directors
irrationally squander or give away corporate assets." Id. at 263.
104. Cf David Rosenberg, Galactic Stupidity and the Business Judgment Rule, 32 J. CORP. L.
301, 304 (2007) ("Although few courts or commentators are willing to use the term, substantive due
care analysis is in fact alive in Delaware fiduciary law, and has been for at least two decades.").
105. Grobow v. Perot, 539 A.2d 180, 189 (Del. 1988) (quoting Saxe v. Brady, 184 A.2d 602, 610
(Del. Ch. 1962)), overruled on other grounds by Brehm, 746 A.2d at 253. See also Lewis v. Vogelstein,
699 A.2d 327, 336 (Del. Ch. 1997) ("Roughly, a waste entails an exchange of corporate assets for
consideration so disproportionately small as to lie beyond the range at which any reasonable person
might be willing to trade."); Glazer v. Zapata Corp., 658 A.2d 176, 183 (Del. Ch. 1993) ("[T]he legal
test [for waste] is severe. Directors are guilty of corporate waste, only when they authorize an exchange
that is so one sided that no business person of ordinary, sound judgment could conclude that the
corporation has received adequate consideration.").
106. Zupnick v. Goizueta, 698 A.2d 384, 387 (Del. Ch. 1997) (quoting Steiner v. Meyerson, No.
13139, 1995 Del. Ch. LEXIS 95, at *3 (Del. Ch. July 19, 1995)). According to Chancellor Allen in
Gagliardiv. TriFoods Int'l, Inc., 683 A.2d 1049, 1051-52 (Del. Ch. 1996), "There is a theoretical
exception ... that holds that some decisions may be so 'egregious' that liability for losses they cause
may follow .... The exception, however, has resulted in no awards of money judgments against
corporate officers or directors in this jurisdiction .... " But see Fidanque v. Am. Maracaibo Co., 92
A.2d 311, 321 (Del. Ch. 1952) ("Since the payment ... constitutes an illegal gift of corporate funds and
amounts to waste,... it is therefore null and void.").
107. Gagliardi,683 A.2d at 1051.
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not assume that directors who have fulfilled fiduciary duties make utterly
irrational decisions. Rather, it assumes only that a director who cannot be
proven to have breached any other fiduciary duty nevertheless can make a
decision that appears irrational. However, a decision that would seem
irrational from the perspective of a faithful director could be perfectly
rational from the perspective of an unfaithful director. Because of the
divergence of standards of conduct and standards of review,1" 8 directors
may breach a fiduciary duty without being held accountable. The fact that a
shareholder cannot establish gross negligence does not mean that directors
were not negligent; the fact that a shareholder cannot establish self-dealing
does not mean that directors were not conflicted; the fact that a shareholder
cannot establish that a decision was unreasonable does not mean that
directors were unbiased; and the fact that a shareholder cannot establish
intentional misconduct does not mean that directors were acting in good
faith. Thus, the basis for the directors' decision could be misbehavior that
otherwise would go unchecked.
In other words, the waste doctrine can be seen as a proxy for breach of
other fiduciary duties, especially the duty of good faith. 10 9 The real
principle, then, is not that a decision was so bad that the director should be
held responsible. Rather, it is that the decision was so bad that it is
reasonable to infer that something is amiss.
Thus, the fifth paradigm for the enforcement of fiduciary duties is that
a breach may be predicated on the substance of a business decision, but
only in extreme circumstances. The shareholders must establish that the
decision has no rational business purpose1 10 or amounts to a waste of
108. See supranote 20 and accompanying text.
109. See White v. Panic, 783 A.2d 543, 554 n.36 (Del. 2001) ("[Tlhe board's decision was so
egregious or irrational that it could not have been based on a valid assessment of the corporation's best
interests."); id. at 553-55; In re The Walt Disney Co. Derivative Litig., 907 A.2d 693, 749 (Del. Ch.
2005) ("The Delaware Supreme Court has implicitly held that committing waste is an act of bad
faith."); In re RJR Nabisco, Inc. S'holders Litig., No. 10389, 1989 Del. Ch. LEXIS 9, at *41 n.13 (Del.
Ch. Jan. 31, 1989) ("As I conceptualize the matter, such limited substantive review as the rule
contemplates (i.e., is the judgment under review 'egregious' or 'irrational' or 'so beyond reason,' etc.)
really is a way of inferring bad faith."); Myron T. Steele, Judicial Scrutiny of Fiduciary Duties in
Delaware Limited Partnershipsand Limited Liability Companies, 32 DEL. J. CORP. L. 1, 29 (2007)
(suggesting that earlier cases had treated "bad faith as tantamount to fraud or an absence of 'rationality'
or a decision 'so far beyond the bounds of reasonable judgment' that it established a 'bad faith' act or
omission" (footnotes omitted)).
110. See Sinclair Oil Corp. v. Levien, 280 A.2d 717, 720 (Del. 1971) ("A board of directors
enjoys a presumption of sound business judgment, and its decisions will not be disturbed if they can be
attributed to any rational business purpose.").
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corporate assets."' This is an extremely heavy burden that is rarely
satisfied.
F. A WORD ON EXCULPATION
There is one important wrinkle that must be addressed at this point, if
only briefly: director exculpation. The Delaware General Corporation Law
authorizes a corporate charter to eliminate the personal liability of directors
for monetary damages for breach of the fiduciary duty of care. 112 The
13
history of such provisions is well known and need not be repeated here.1
It is sufficient to note that many companies have adopted such provisions,
effectively eliminating personal liability for breach of the duty of care. It is
obvious that this type of provision would have a significant practical effect
on litigation.
For purposes of this Article, two observations are in order. First,
although such a provision may eliminate personal liability for breach of the
duty of care, it does not eliminate the duty of care itself. Thus, injunctive
relief is not precluded. 14 Second, the statutory provision is not, itself, part
of the law of fiduciary duties. It merely authorizes individuals to contract
around the duty of care if they choose. At least in Delaware, if shareholders
do not consent, the duty of care remains unchanged and liability for
Thus, while the director exculpation statute may
damages may result.'
have significant real-world consequences, it does not alter the first
paradigm for enforcement of fiduciary duties. It merely limits the remedies
111. See I AMERICAN LAW INSTITUTE, PRINCIPLES OF CORPORATE GOVERNANCE: ANALYSIS AND
RECOMMENDATIONS § 1.42 (1994) ("A transaction constitutes a 'waste of corporate assets' if it
involves an expenditure of corporate funds or a disposition of corporate assets for which no
consideration is received in exchange and for which there is no rational business purpose, or, if
consideration is received in exchange, the consideration the corporation receives is so inadequate in
value that no person of ordinary sound business judgment would deem it worth that which the
corporation has paid.").
112. See infra text accompanying note 170 (quoting DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 8, § 102(b)(7) (2010)).
For a list of similar statutes, see Cindy A. Schipani, Integrating Corporate Law Principles with
CERCLA Liabilityfor EnvironmentalHazards, 18 DEL. J. CORP. L. 1, 34 n.109 (1993).
113. See, e.g., John L. Reed & Matt Neiderman, "Good Faith" and the Ability of Directors to
Assert § 102(b)(7) of the Delaware General Corporation Law as a Defense to Claims Alleging
Abdication, Lack of Oversight, and Similar Breaches of FiduciaryDuty, 29 DEL. J. CORP. L. 111, 11319 (2004); Strine etal., supra note 12, at 659-63.
114. Disney, 907 A.2d at 752.
115. Delaware's exculpation statute is an opt-in provision. In some states, it is an opt-out
provision. See, e.g., OHIO REV. CODE ANN. § 1701.59(D) (West 2010). In others, it is a mandatory
provision. See, e.g., IND. CODE § 23-1-35-1(e) (2010). In still others, instead of complete exculpation,
liability is limited to a specified amount. See, e.g., VA. CODE ANN. § 13.1-692.1 (2010).
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that may be available in many cases.
III. ARGUING SEMANTICS
Two of the leading protagonists in the debate on the number of
fiduciary duties in corporate law are Vice Chancellor Strine and Eisenberg.
Long before the Delaware Supreme Court reversed course in Stone, Strine
was authoring opinions arguing that the duty of good faith should be seen
as subset of the duty of loyalty." 6 More recently, in an article coauthored
with Lawrence A. Hammermesh, R. Franklin Balotti, and Jeffrey M.
Gorris, the Vice Chancellor refined his earlier arguments and his case more
he argues
fully."' Eisenberg disagrees. In an article that predates Stone,
118
duty.
separate
a
considered,
be
should
and
is,
that good faith
Semantics play a surprisingly large role in their debate. In this part, I
will consider the arguments raised by Strine, as well as some of
Eisenberg's responses. Section A addresses the etymological arguments. I
contend that Strine does not prove that the terms good faith and loyalty are
synonymous. Section B considers an important test of whether good faith is
a subset of loyalty: whether it is possible for one who acts in bad faith to be
considered loyal. I argue that it is. Section C addresses the role of good
faith in the Delaware General Corporation Law. I argue that the evidence
supports the existence of a separate duty of good faith. Section D addresses
the rest of Strine's arguments. I contend that Strine develops a framework
for conceptualizing fiduciary duties that is plausible, but he does not
present compelling evidence to support his theory. This is important
because other theories are also plausible. Section E concludes that the
number of fiduciary duties cannot be determined by reference to semantic
arguments.
A. ETYMOLOGY

Strine's arguments begin with etymology. Essentially, he notes that
116. See, e.g., Teachers' Ret. Sys. of La. v. Aidinoff, 900 A.2d 654, 668 (Del. Ch. 2006);
Hollinger Inc. v. Hollinger Int'l, Inc., 858 A.2d 342, 387 (Del. Ch. 2004); Guttman v. Huang, 823 A.2d
492, 506 n.34 (Del. Ch. 2003); Nagy v. Bistricer, 770 A.2d 43, 49 n.2 (Del. Ch. 2000); In re Gaylord
Container Corp. S'holders Litig., 753 A.2d 462, 475-76 n.41 (Del. Ch. 2000) (citing Cede & Co. v.
Technicolor, Inc., 634 A.2d 345, 368 n.36 (Del. 1993)); In re ML/EQ Real Estate P'ship Litig., No.
15741, 1999 Del. Ch. LEXIS 238, at *16 n.20 (Del. Ch. Dec. 20, 1999).
117. See Strine et al., supra note 12. For the sake of convenience, I will refer to the coauthors
collectively as "Strine."
118. See Eisenberg, supra note 12.
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"loyalty, fidelity, and faithfulness are all synonyms,"" 9 and that, "[p]ut
together with the word 'good,' the word 'faith' bears an unbreakable
relationship to concepts of fidelity and loyalty."' 120 He concludes that "it is
linguistic nonsense to divorce the defining concept of good faith from the
terms-faith, fidelity, and loyalty-to which it gives effective life.''
Eisenberg takes issue with Strine's etymology. He argues that Strine
"looked up the wrong word."'122 Specifically, Eisenberg contends that
[t]here is a crucial difference between faith, upon whose definition the
Vice Chancellor's argument rests, and good faith. Faith, as Vice
Chancellor Strine accurately reports, means allegiance. Good faith does
not. The difference is severe.... [T]he definition of good faith includes
multiple elements,
and... neither allegiance nor loyalty is one of those
23
elements. 1
Eisenberg then shows how dictionary definitions of the term good faith
24
demonstrate that it is not synonymous with loyalty. 1
Strine does not respond directly to Eisenberg's argument. He admits
that "the phrase 'good faith' is often broadly defined as 'honesty or
lawfulness of purpose' or 'compliance with standards of decency and
honesty," ' 125 but he tries to massage those definitions into conformity with
his claim. Thus, he argues that the "broad usage is fully consistent with the
requirement that to be 'good,' one has to be true to a certain form of
'faith."",126 Such arguments have a ring of plausibility, but are not
persuasive.
Strine does offer one strong etymological argument in response to
Eisenberg. As he notes, "The Oxford English Dictionary defines good faith
as 'fidelity, loyalty' and directs the reader to the following definition of
faith: 'The quality of fulfilling one's trust; faithfulness, fidelity,
loyalty."" 2 7 This argument merits more attention.
119. Strine et al., supra note 12, at 644-45 (footnotes omitted).
120. Id. at646.
121. Id. at648.
122. Eisenberg, supranote 12, at 15.
123. Id.
124. See id. at 16.
125. Strine et al., supra note 12, at 646 (footnotes omitted) (quoting WEBSTER'S NINTH NEW
COLLEGIATE DICTIONARY 527 (9th ed. 1988); and THE AMERICAN HERITAGE DICTIONARY OF THE
ENGLISH LANGUAGE 757 (4th ed. 2000)).
126. Id.
127. Id. at 646 n.47 (alteration omitted) (quoting 5 OXFORD ENGLISH DICTIONARY 679 (2d ed.
1989) [hereinafter OED]).
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The Oxford English Dictionarydoes not define the term "good faith"

independently; rather, the term is included under the main entry of the term
"faith." The complete definition reads as follows:
11. good faith, bad faith: = L. bona, mala fides, in which the primary

notion seems to have been the objective aspect of confidence well or ill
bestowed. The Eng. uses closely follow those of L.
a. good faith: fidelity, loyalty (=sense 10 [i.e., "The quality of fulfilling
one's trust; faithfulness, fidelity, loyalty."]); esp. honesty of intention in
entering into engagements, sincerity in professions, bonafides.
b. bad faith: faithlessness, treachery; intent to deceive.
Punic (rarely
128
Carthaginian)faith(=L. fides Punica): faithlessness.

A few observations are in order. First, although the definition does
include reference to faithfulness and loyalty, this is not surprising given the
term's inclusion as a mere "sense" (or subentry) of faith. In other
dictionaries, it appears as a separate term.1 29 Second, even in this
definition, there seems to be a strong connotative tilt toward honesty and
sincerity. Third, the definition emphasizes the Latin origin, bona fides,
which The Oxford English Dictionary itself defines simply as "[g]ood faith,
freedom from intent to deceive." 130
Moreover, other dictionaries are much less supportive of Strine's
claim. As Eisenberg points out, Webster's Third New International
Dictionary,13 1 the American Heritage Dictionary,132 and the Random

House Dictionary133 all have definitions that have very little to do with
loyalty. Honesty, sincerity, decency, and lawfulness seem to be the core
meaning.
Legal dictionaries are generally in accord. 13 4 Like The Oxford English
128.
129.
130.

5 OED, supranote 127, at 679.
See infra notes 131-35 and accompanying text.
2 OED, supranote 127, at 379.

131.

See

WEBSTER'S THIRD NEW INTERNATIONAL DICTIONARY OF THE ENGLISH LANGUAGE

UNABRIDGED 978 (3d ed. 1993) ("[G]oodfaith n :a state of mind indicating honesty and lawfulness of
purpose :belief in one's legal title or right :belief that one's conduct is not unconscionable or that
known circumstances do not require further investigation : absence of fraud, deceit, collusion, or gross
negligence-usu. used with in ...").
132. See AMERICAN HERITAGE DICTIONARY OF THE ENGLISH LANGUAGE 757 (4th ed. 2000)
("Compliance with standards of decency and honesty.").
133. See RANDOM HOUSE UNABRIDGED DICTIONARY 822 (2d ed. 1993) ("[G]ood' faith',
accordance with standards of honesty, trust, sincerity, etc. (usually prec. by in)....").
134. See, e.g., BALLENTINE'S LEGAL DICTIONARY AND THESAURUS 275 (1995) ("[G]oodfaith n.
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Dictionary, Black's Law Dictionary adds a slight wrinkle. It defines good
faith as follows:
[G]oodfaith, n. A state of mind consisting in (1) honesty in belief or
purpose, (2) faithfulness to one's duty or obligation, (3) observance of
reasonable commercial standards of fair dealing in a given trade or
seek unconscionable
business, or (4) absence of intent to defraud or to135
advantage.-Also termed bonafides. Cf. badfaith.
For the most part, this definition tracks the others. However, the second
numbered clause, "faithfulness to one's duty or obligation," seems
consistent with Strine's position. Ironically, Eisenberg cites Black's Law
Dictionary, while Strine does not. 136 This is not coincidental. Rather, it
reflects the fact that, on balance, the definition supports the claim that good
faith is something different from loyalty.
Thus, from a purely etymological perspective, Strine's argument is
unpersuasive. Good faith is something different from loyalty. There may be
some overlap, but not enough to suggest that good faith is a subset of
loyalty.
B. LOYALTY WITHOUT GOOD FAITH?

One straightforward way to determine whether good faith is a subset
of loyalty is to ask whether it is possible for someone to be loyal without
acting in good faith. Both Strine and Eisenberg consider this by focusing on
one specific aspect of the duty of good faith: the duty to avoid intentional
violations of law. If a director who intentionally violates the law can be
considered loyal to the corporation and its shareholders, then good faith
cannot be considered merely a subset of loyalty.
Fairness and equity; the absence of improper motive or of a negligent disregard of the rights of others;
the honest and reasonable belief that one's conduct is proper; the opposite of fraud and deceit."); 1
JOHN BOUVIER, LAW DICTIONARY 211 (14th ed. 1880) ("[B]ona fides. Good faith, honesty, as
distinguished from malafides (bad faith)."); 1 ALEXANDER M. BURRILL, LAW DICTIONARY 213 (2d ed.

1870) ("[B]onafides. Lat. In the civil and common law. Good faith; honesty; sincerity. The opposite of
mala fides, (q.v.)."); MERRIAM-WEBSTER'S DICTIONARY OF LAW 215 (1996)

("[G]ood faith n

[translationof Latin bonafides] :honesty, fairness, and lawfulness of purpose: absence of any intent to
defraud, act maliciously, or take unfair advantage." (second set of brackets in original)); LAW.COM LAW

DICTIONARY, http://dictionary.law.com/Default.aspx?selected=819 (search "Enter a Legal Term" for
"good faith"; then follow "good faith" hyperlink under "Select a word") ("[G]oodfaith n. honest intent
to act without taking an unfair advantage over another person or to fulfill a promise to act, even when
some legal technicality is not fulfilled. The term is applied to all kinds of transactions.").
135.

BLACK'S LAW DICTIONARY 762 (9thed. 2009).

136.

See Eisenberg, supra note 12, at 16; Strine etal., supra note 12.
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According to Eisenberg:
A manager's obligation not to knowingly cause the corporation to
violate the law has traditionally and properly been founded on the duty
of good faith. A corporate manager who knowingly causes the
corporation to violate the law lacks honesty, because he knows that he is
acting improperly and is violating generally accepted standards of
decency applicable to the conduct of business. In addition, such a
manager lacks fidelity to his office, because the organization in which
his office is embedded is obliged to act within the boundaries set by the
law and can reasonably expect its managers to act accordingly. In
contrast, the obligation not to knowingly cause the corporation to violate
the law cannot be founded on the duties of care and loyalty. A manager
who knowingly causes the corporation to violate the law will seldom
violate the duty of loyalty, because typically the manager does not
engage in self-interested conduct, and will seldom violate the duty of
that the illegal
care, because typically the manager rationally believes
1 37
conduct will serve the end of profit maximization.
Strine disagrees. Because his definition of loyalty includes fidelity in
every sense of the word, including general fidelity to office, a breach of
good faith is necessarily a breach of loyalty:
For a corporate director knowingly to cause the corporation to engage in
unlawful acts or activities or enter an unlawful business is disloyal in the
most fundamental of senses. A publicly chartered corporation becomes a
legal citizen imbued with rights and responsibilities. When directors
knowingly cause the corporation to do what it may not-engage in
unlawful acts or unlawful businesses-they are disloyal to the
corporation's essential nature. By causing the corporation to become a
lawless rogue, they make the corporation untrue to itself and to the
promise underlying its own societally authorized birth. No agent can act
loyally toward a principal by undertaking, without authority, consciously
unlawful activity in the name of the principal. In the case of a
corporation, the corporation has no power to give directors that authority
because the corporation's existence is premised on the nondefeasible
promise that it will conduct only lawful business through lawful
activities. Law compliance thus comes ahead of profit-seeking as a
matter of the corporation's mission, and directors owe a duty of loyalty
to that hierarchy. In so creating that hierarchy, corporation law has
imbued all corporations with the mandatory value system of many sole
proprietors, who would rather make less money than reap profits by
engaging in illegal businesses or activities. Fidelity to that hierarchy is
137.

Id. at 38 (footnote omitted).
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required38of corporate directors in their supervision of the corporation's
affairs.'
Who has the better argument? As a positive matter under Stone, the
answer clearly is Strine. However, this debate presupposes that the Stone
court may have gotten it wrong. Before Stone, it would not have been
difficult to demonstrate that the standard of review for the duty of loyalty
focused on financial conflicts.' 39 The real question, then, is this: Setting
aside Stone, what is the best characterization of the duty of loyalty?
Strine defends a very broad description of the duty of loyalty on the
grounds that "it has been traditional for the duty of loyalty to be articulated
capaciously, in a manner that emphasizes not only the obligation of a loyal
fiduciary to refrain from advantaging herself at the expense of the
corporation but, just as importantly, to act affirmatively to further the
corporation's best interests." 140 There are a number of problems with this
claim, however.
In the first place, it is not clear that when courts use such capacious
language, they are always referring to the duty of loyalty specifically, as
opposed to fiduciary duties generally. Take, for example, the classic
language in Guth, which was quoted earlier.' 4' This passage generally is
considered to refer to the duty of loyalty. Because the facts of the case
involved the duty of loyalty, this is a natural inference. Close examination,
however, reveals that most of the passage actually deals with fiduciary
duties generally, rather than the duty of loyalty specifically. It is
noteworthy that Strine describes loyalty as including not only a negative
component, but also an affirmative component. Linguistically, this phrasing
reflects an attempt to expand the breadth of loyalty. By comparison, the
Guth court describes a fiduciary's duty as including not only an affirmative
component, but also a negative component. Only thereafter does the
opinion mention loyalty; and when it does so, it focuses on conflicts of
interest. Thus, for the entire passage to be interpreted as referring to the
duty of loyalty, the Guth court would have had to consider loyalty as
consisting primarily of affirmative duties and only secondarily of the
avoidance of conflicts. This, however, seems doubtful. 142 The more
138. Strine et al., supranote 12, at 650-51 (footnotes omitted).
139. See infra notes 154-56 and accompanying text.
140. Strine etal., supra note 12, at 634 (emphasis added). See also Lyman Johnson, After Enron:
Remembering Loyalty Discourse in CorporateLaw, 28 DEL. J. CORP. L. 27, 37-42 (2003).
141.
See supra text accompanying note 30.
142. In Unocal, the Delaware Supreme Court's interpretation of Guth seems consistent with my
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reasonable interpretation is that the Guth court was speaking of fiduciary
duties generally before turning to the duty of loyalty in particular. 14 3 Thus,
Strine's reliance on capacious language is unwarranted.I'"
Of course, there have been other cases in which courts have spoken
specifically of the duty of loyalty in equally capacious terms. 145 This
own: that the Guth court was speaking about more than just the duty of loyalty. See Unocal Corp. v.
Mesa Petroleum Co., 493 A.2d 946, 955 (Del. 1985). Immediately after citing Guth for the "the basic
principle that corporate directors have a fiduciary duty to act in the best interests of the corporation's
stockholders," the opinion states that "their duty of care extends to protecting the corporation and its
owners from perceived harm whether a threat originates from third parties or other shareholders." Id.
(emphasis added) (citation omitted). This suggests that the court understood Guth's affirmative duty to
be referring to the duty of care rather than the duty of loyalty.
143. Admittedly, at the very end, the passage arguably seems to conflate honesty, good faith, and
loyalty: "The occasions for the determination of honesty, good faith and loyal conduct are many and
varied, and no hard and fast rule can be formulated. The standard of loyalty is measured by no fixed
scale." Guth v. Loft, Inc., 5 A.2d 503, 510 (Del. 1939). Despite the appearance of conflation, however,
the passage is perfectly consistent with the interpretation that I propose: the court is speaking of both
fiduciary duties generally and loyalty in particular. The above-quoted passage could be paraphrased as
follows: "The occasions for the determination of breach vel non of fiduciary duty are many and varied,
and no hard and fast rule can be formulated. As a result, the standard of loyalty is measured by no fixed
scale."
144. Strine also relies on Chancellor Allen's opinion in In re RJR Nabisco, Inc. S'holders Litig.,
No. 10389, 1989 Del. Ch. LEXIS 9 (Del. Ch. Jan. 31, 1989). Strine quotes the following passage in
particular:
Greed is not the only human emotion that can pull one from the path of propriety; so might
hatred, lust, envy, revenge, or, as is here alleged, shame or pride. Indeed any human emotion
may cause a director to place his own interests, preferences or appetites before the welfare of
the corporation. But if he were to be shown to have done so, how can the protection of the
business judgment rule be available to him? In such a case, is it not apparent that such a
director would be required to demonstrate that the corporation had not been injured and to
remedy any injury that appears to have been occasioned by such transaction?
Id. at *46-47. As Strine admits, however, this passage appears in a discussion of good faith, not loyalty.
Strine et al., supra note 12, at 676. Moreover, the preceding sentence makes clear that the passage is not
about the duty of loyalty at all, but rather about the business judgment rule. See Nabisco, 1989 Del. Ch.
LEXIS 9, at *46 ("Neither case, however, can be read to hold that the protections of the business
judgment rule would be available to a fiduciary who could be shown to have caused a transaction to be
effectuated (even one in which he had no financial interest) for a reason unrelated to a pursuit of the
corporation's best interests."). Although it is true that "Chancellor Allen nowhere articulates a 'third'
duty separate from loyalty or care," Strine et al., supra note 12, at 676, his opinion predated the
Delaware Supreme Court's triadic formulation of fiduciary duties and the modern development of the
concept of good faith, so that should not be expected. Nevertheless, it seems reasonably clear that
Chancellor Allen understood that he was doing something different under the guise of good faith than
was typical for the duty of loyalty.
145. Strine cites Ivanhoe Partners v. Newmont Mining Corp., 535 A.2d 1334, 1345 (Del. 1987)
("[The duty of loyalty] embodies not only an affirmative duty to protect the interests of the corporation,
but also an obligation to refrain from conduct which would injure the corporation and its stockholders
or deprive them of profit or advantage."); and In re The Walt Disney Co. DerivativeLitig., No. 15452,
2004 Del. Ch. LEXIS 132, at *24 n.49 (Del. Ch. Sept. 10, 2004) ("[A]s this Court previously stated, the
'duty of loyalty ...imposes an affirmative obligation to protect and advance the interests of the
corporation and mandates that [a director] absolutely refrain from any conduct that would harm the
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should not be surprising. Earlier courts were not dealing with the issues that
are relevant today-issues of the precise number of fiduciary duties-and
the question probably did not even occur to them. Moreover, as Strine
notes, "the primary equitable duty that was thought to constrain directors
until the issuance of the Van Gorkom decision in 1985 was the duty of
loyalty."' 146 With litigation focused on the duty of loyalty, it would not be
surprising to find judicial opinions focusing on the duty of loyalty. That
does not mean that there was
not a separate duty of care, and possibly a
147
separate duty of good faith.
Finally, every fiduciary duty can be described in either broad or
narrow terms. One manifestation of this is the divergence between
standards of conduct and standards of review. 148 Just as the duty of loyalty
can be described capaciously, so can the duties of care and good faith.
Thus, there may be significant overlap among duties, in which case it
would be unfair to characterize any one duty as a subset of another. 149
The standard of conduct for a fiduciary duty often is significantly
broader than the standard of review, but the two are closely related. They
should be similar in scope, with the major difference being that the former
demands more of directors than the latter. This is how it works with the
duty of care. The standard of conduct requires ordinary care-the
avoidance of negligence-while the standard of review requires more
evidence of wrong-doing-gross negligence. 150 The subject matter of the
two standards is identical. Effectively, I have argued earlier that this pattern
corporation."' (quoting BelCom, Inc. v. Robb, No. 14663, 1998 Del. Ch. LEXIS 58, at *10 (Del. Ch.
Apr. 28, 1998))). Strine et al., supra note 12, at 635 n.10. Both cases rely on Guth, however: Ivanhoe
does so directly, see Ivanhoe, 535 A.2d at 1345 (citing Guth, 5 A.2d at 510); and Disney does so
indirectly, through BelCom, Inc. v. Robb, 1998 Del. Ch. LEXIS 58, at *10 (citing Guth, 5 A.2d at 510),
see Disney, 2004 Del Ch. LEXIS 132, at *24 n.49.
146. Strine et al., supra note 12, at 641 n.24.
147. Strine complains that the court "discovered" the duty of good faith in 1993, see Strine et al.,
supra note 12, at 639, but his concern is the categorization of good faith as a free-standing duty. He
seems to agree with the substance of the duty, provided it remains a subset of loyalty. It is ironic that he
is not concerned with the discovery of the substance of the duty of good faith as recently as 2005, see In
re The Walt Disney Co. Derivative Litig., 907 A.2d 693, 755-56 (Del. Ch. 2005) (ascribing substantive
meaning to duty of good faith), or what amounts to a substantive discovery of a duty of care in 1985,
see Strine et al., supra note 12, at 641 n.24 ("Before [Van Gorkom], the duty of care had largely an
admonitory, rather than enforceable, basis in American corporate law.").
148. See generally Eisenberg, supra note 20 (discussing how and why standards of review and of
standards of conduct diverge in corporate law).
149. See infra Part IV..
150. See supra Part II.A.
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is true of other fiduciary duties, as well. 151 The same should hold true for
the duty of loyalty. Just as the standard of review focuses on conflicts of
interest, so too should the standard of conduct be understood to focus on
52

conflicts of interest. 1

Strine decries the "rhetorical shrinking of the concept of loyalty" that
would reduce the duty of loyalty to financial conflicts, 153 but the duty of
54
loyalty is often described as relating primarily to financial conflicts.'
Until Stone, it was broader in rhetoric only. In fact, only months before its
Stone decision, in the Disney case, the Delaware Supreme Court said the
following:
[T]he universe of fiduciary misconduct is not limited to either disloyalty
in the classic sense (i.e., preferring the adverse self-interest of the
fiduciary or of a related person to the interest of the corporation) or gross
negligence. Cases have arisen where corporate directors have no
conflicting self-interest in a decision, yet engage in misconduct that is
more culpable than simple inattention or failure to be informed of all
facts material to the decision. To protect the interests of the corporation
and its shareholders, fiduciary conduct of this kind, which does not
involve disloyalty (as traditionally defined) but is qualitatively more
culpable than gross negligence, should be proscribed. A vehicle is
needed to address such violations doctrinally, and that doctrinal vehicle
is the duty to act in good faith.' 55

Even if this passage can be said to be consistent with the later opinion in
151. See supra Parts 11.BI.E.
152. The alternative is to expand the duty of loyalty to comprise two very divergent standards of
review. This is possible but, as I argue in Part IV, it is simpler to say that they are two different
fiduciary duties.
153. Strine et al., supra note 12, at 634. See also, e.g., id. at 644 ("[T]he only function of a
separate duty of good faith would be to fill the conceptual space created by the shrinking of the
traditionally broad duty of loyalty required to accommodate the conversion of the long-standing
definition of a loyal state of mind into a free-standing duty. The free-standing duty of good faith is thus
a solution to the problem of its own invention.").
154. See, e.g., I BLOCK, BARTON & RADIN, supra note 97, at 261-64; Bainbridge, Lopez &
Oklan, supra note 12, at 585 ("The duty of loyalty traditionally focused on cases in which the defendant
fiduciary received an improper financial benefit."); Eisenberg, supra note 12, at 5 ("The standard of
conduct under the duty of loyalty essentially requires a manager to act fairly when he acts in his own
pecuniary self-interest or in the pecuniary interest of an associate or a family member."); Hill &
McDonnell, supra note 49, at 835 ("Courts recognize self-dealing in situations where a director, officer,
or controlling shareholder has clearly identifiable, specific monetary interests at stake in a decision that
puts her own self-interest at odds with the interests of the corporation."); Reed & Neiderman, supra
note 113, at 121 (noting that "existence, or lack thereof, of an adverse financial interest" is traditional
concept of loyalty).
155.
In re Walt Disney Co. Derivative Litig., 906 A.2d 27, 66 (Del. 2006).
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Stone, which is doubtful, it establishes, at the very least, that the "classic"
or "traditional" understanding of disloyalty refers to conflicts of interest.
Moreover, in Stone, the court described the claim "that the fiduciary duty
of loyalty is not limited to cases involving a financial or other cognizable
fiduciary conflict of interest" as a "doctrinal consequence" of its novel
interpretation of good faith. 15 6 If this is correct and the (traditional) duty of
loyalty is primarily about the avoidance of conflicts then an intentional
violation of law is not necessarily a breach of the duty of loyalty.
Because the issue ultimately is more semantic than legal in nature, a
commonsense approach would be helpful. The question, phrased generally,
is this: Can one be honest without being loyal and loyal without being
honest? The fair answer seems to be yes. One can be honest without being
and one can be loyal without being
loyal by disclosing the conflict,' 57
58
patemalistically.1
honest by acting
Phrased more specifically, the question is this: Can a director who
intentionally violates the law be considered loyal to the corporation and its
shareholders? Some very prominent commentators who have considered
the question seem to think so.' 5 9 Strine argues not: he believes that by
violating the law, a director is not being loyal to the corporation or to its
shareholders, who have not authorized the illegal actions. 160 This is a
highly legalistic answer, and one that is not satisfying on a gut level. 161
156. Stone ex rel. AmSouth Bancorporation v. Ritter, 911 A.2d 362, 370 (Del. 2006).
157. Cf United States v. O'Hagan, 521 U.S. 642, 655 (1997) ("Because the deception essential to
the misappropriation theory [of insider trading] involves feigning fidelity to the source of information,
if the fiduciary discloses to the source that he plans to trade on the nonpublic information, there is no
'deceptive device' and thus no § 10(b) violation-although the fiduciary-turned-trader may remain
liable under state law for breach of a duty of loyalty.").
158. See, e.g., Blasius Indus., Inc. v. Atlas Corp., 564 A.2d 651, 662 (Del. Ch. 1988).
159. See, e.g., Bainbridge, Lopez & Oklan, supra note 12, at 591-94; Eisenberg, supra note 12, at
38.
160. See Strine et al., supranote 12, at 648-53.
161. Strine argues that "[t]o somehow contend that it is loyal to engage in consciously unlawful
conduct because the directors believed in good faith that the conduct would be in the best interests of
stockholders desiring profits but in bad faith toward society is, well, silly." Id. at 653. With all due
respect, this argument is frivolous. No one argues that intentional violations of law should be permitted,
or even that they should not constitute a breach of fiduciary duty. The only question is whether the duty
breached is that of loyalty. Strine's argument boils down to a claim that the duty of loyalty is so
expansive that it can easily encompass intentional violations of law. Eisenberg's claim, on the other
hand-or at least mine-is that it is not a natural or obvious fit. Why try to fit the square peg of good
faith into the round hole of loyalty? And while Strine is confident that even "elementary school students
can grasp" his framework, id., it is just as likely that even elementary school students would not be lost
by a move from a framework that had two duties to one that had three, or even five. None of these
frameworks are especially confusing. The question is which one works best.
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Of course the courts cannot allow intentional violations of law. That
does not mean that no one will ever want to violate the law, however.
Realistically, the corporation and its shareholders may sometimes want the
corporation to undertake illegal actions for pecuniary benefit even though
the law forbids it. 162 Shareholders may communicate their desire for such
an undertaking to the fiduciaries, either implicitly or explicitly. 163 If this
occurs and the directors comply, it is theoretically possible for directors to
violate the law intentionally without being disloyal to the corporation and
its shareholders. Any "disloyalty" would be to the law and to society,
which is not what the duty of loyalty is about. 164 Of course, it may be
difficult to determine when intentional violations of law would be loyal and
when they would be disloyal. This problem very well may warrant a
prophylactic rule forbidding intentional violations of law. Such a rule,
however, would be based on practical considerations rather than on loyalty
itself.
Finally, it is unfair to say that any violation of the law, however small
and regardless of the circumstances, would amount to a breach of the duty
of loyalty. Difficult situations may require managers to prioritize among
conflicting duties. In such cases, a director may reasonably conclude that it
would be in the interests of the corporation and its shareholders to violate a
very minor law in order to achieve a significant benefit-for example,
double-parking in order to make an important delivery. 165 Such a decision
may be wrong and illegal, but it would not necessarily be disloyal.
To be perfectly clear, I am not arguing that an intentional violation of
law is ever acceptable or that it is not necessarily a breach of fiduciary
duty. I am only arguing that it is not necessarily disloyal. If there is a
breach of fiduciary duty, it is of the duty of good faith. Intentional
violations of the law may be disloyal in many cases-perhaps even most
cases-but they are not intrinsically so.
162. As Strine points out, the law only permits corporate charters to authorize "lawful act[s] or
activit[ies]." See Strine et al., supra note 12, at 650 (quoting DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 8, § 102(a)(3)
(2010)).
163. 1 say "undertake" rather than "authorize" because the law need not treat an illegal
undertaking as an authorized action.
164.

Even the duty of good faith, which includes the prohibition against intentional violations of

law, is not about a duty to the law or society. It is about honesty and uprightness toward the
shareholders. The law merely presumes that shareholders want directors to obey the law, and that
therefore intentional misconduct includes intentional violations of law.
165. See Bainbridge, Lopez & Oklan, supra note 12, at 592.
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C. DELAWARE GENERAL CORPORATION LAW
Another line of argument in the debate between Strine and Eisenberg
focuses on the use of the term good faith in the Delaware General
Corporation Law. Eisenberg argues that "[t]here is little doubt that as a
matter of positive law, corporate managers owe a duty of good faith."' 16 6 He
refers to section 145, which conditions director indemnification on good
faith; section 144, which allows transactions tainted by a conflict of interest
to be cleansed by the approval of disinterested directors provided that they
act in good faith; and section 102(b)(7), which does not allow directors
to
167
be exculpated for liability for acts or omissions not in good faith.
Strine discusses the various statutory provisions as well. He insists
that the use of the term is consistent with his understanding of good faith as
pertaining to the state of mind of a loyal fiduciary. 168 At least with respect
to sections 144 and 145, however, there is more assertion than argument.
Strine can be summarized as follows: "To us, it is obvious that th[ese]
requirement[s] reflect[] a statutory adoption of the core concept of loyalty,
which is that directors must act in the good faith belief that their decision
will benefit the corporation and its stockholders ratably and not for an
improper purpose." 169 This does not refute Eisenberg's arguments.
Strine's best arguments are raised in the discussion of section
102(b)(7). That provision reads as follows:
[T]he certificate of incorporation may... contain.., the following....

A provision eliminating or limiting the personal liability of a director to
the corporation or its stockholders for monetary damages for breach of
fiduciary duty as a director, provided that such provision shall not
eliminate or limit the liability of a director: (i) For any breach of the
director's duty of loyalty to the corporation or its stockholders; (ii) for

acts or omissions not in good faith or which involve intentional
misconduct or a knowing violation of law; (iii) under § 174 of this title;
or (iv) for any transaction from which the director derived an improper
70
personal benefit. 1

Strine admits that the separate references to loyalty and good faith
166.
167.
168.
169.
170.

Eisenberg, supra note 12, at 6.
Id. at 6-10 (citing DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 8, §§ 102(b)(7), 144-145 (2010)).
Strine et al., supra note 12, at 655-59.
ld. at 657.
DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 8, § 102(b)(7).
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may suggest that the two are separate duties. 7 ' He argues, however, that
as a belt-and-suspenders
this is merely "redundancy" which "operat[es]
172
consequences."'
unintended
protection against
Strine suggests that the provision could have been written, and should
be interpreted, as follows:
The certificate of incorporation may include a provision eliminating or
limiting the personal liability of a director to the corporation or its
stockholders for monetary damage for breach of fiduciary duty of care as
a director, provided that such provisions shall not eliminate or limit the
liability of a director for a breach of the duty of loyalty, including but not
limited to any:
i) transactions from which the director derived an unfair or improper
personal profit or benefit;
ii) acts or omissions not in good faith;
iii) intentional misconduct; or
iv) knowing violations of law.
In addition, the certificate may173not limit a director's liability for a
violation of § 174 of this chapter.

In fact, this interpretation reflects significant revision. Strine does not
have a very good explanation for why the drafters did not mean what they
said or say what they meant. His only explanation for the inclusion of the
duty of good faith was that the plaintiffs' bar insisted on it. 174 Far from
proving his point, however, this actually establishes that practicing
attorneys believed that good faith was something different from loyalty.
Because this demand prevailed, it seems odd to suggest that the secret
intentions of the drafters should govern.
If, as Strine argues, the drafters wanted to distinguish between the
175
duty of care, which is exculpable, and the duty of loyalty, which is not,
they could have rewritten the statute as easily as Strine did. There is an
even easier solution, however: the provision could have stated simply that
only breaches of the duty of care may be exculpable, without mentioning
171.
Strine et al., supra note 12, at 659 ("We do not pretend that section 102(b)(7) does not
suggest that there is a category of bad faith acts that cause corporate injury that is somehow beyond the
reach of the duty of loyalty. The separate references to the duty of loyalty and to acts 'not in good faith'
can be thought to have exactly that implication.").
172. Id.at 660.
173. Id. at 662-63.
174. Id. at 662.
175. Id. at 660-62.
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the duty of loyalty or anything else. The solution is so obvious that I often
have wondered why they did not settle on it. 176 In any event, regardless of
what the drafters could have done or should have done, the law reflects
only what they did in fact.
Strine raises a similar counterargument. He notes that there is no
"indication that the statute was intended to recognize new fiduciary
duties,"1 77 and that the statute refers to loyalty as a "duty," but to good faith
only as the quality of an act or omission, and not as a "duty."' 7 8 Thus, his
argument runs, the statute should not be interpreted as creating a new duty.
This is a fair point, but no one has argued that the statute should be
interpreted in that way. The concept of good faith significantly predates
section 102(b)(7). Those who claim that good faith is an independent duty
179
insist that it has always existed, if only implicitly.
Strine also argues that the reliance on section 102(b)(7) to prove the
existence of a duty of good faith is problematic:
[I]f the separate articulation in section 102(b)(7) from the duty of loyalty
of "acts not in good faith" as a category of nonexculpable conduct
supports a more general fiduciary duty of "good faith," section 102(b)(7)
becomes a source of several new fiduciary duties. Along with the duty to
act in good faith, there would emerge no fewer than four other duties:
(1) the duty not to engage in intentional misconduct; (2) the duty not to
knowingly violate the law; (3) the duty not to pay dividends in violation
of section 174; and (4) the duty not to receive improper personal
180
benefits.

Unfortunately, Strine's argument is too simplistic. He overlooks the
fact that the duty of loyalty is dealt with in clause (i), while bad faith,
176. I have always believed it was because the drafters had a notion that there might be additional
duties or that the courts might shuffle the content of the various duties. Because the law of fiduciary
duties is always developing, this is a reasonable fear. Thus, drafters who tilted promanagement would
not want to limit exculpation to the duty of care; they would want to exculpate everything except a few
specified items. Drafters representing the plaintiffs' bar, on the other hand, would "want[] very broad
exceptions." Id. at 662.
177. Idat661.
178. Id.at 662.
179. See Eisenberg, supra note 12, at 11 ("In short, the duty of good faith has long been both
explicit and implicit in corporation statutes and implicit in case law. Recently, it has become explicit in
case law as well.").
180. Strine et al., supra note 12, at 660. He goes on to point out that "just as section 102(b)(7)
separates the duty of loyalty from 'intentional misconduct' and the receipt of 'improper personal
benefits,' so too does section 102(b)(7) separate its references to 'acts not in good faith' from 'knowing
violations of law."' Id.
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intentional misconduct, and knowing violation of law are dealt with
together in clause (ii). Thus, it is reasonable to interpret the three categories
in the second clause as roughly synonymous with each other but different
from clause (i). Clause (iii) deals with improper dividends. This has
nothing to do with disloyalty; section 174 exists for the protection of
creditors.181
Clause (iv) is a bit more tricky. Strine argues that
even those inclined to view the obligation of loyalty as an extremely
narrow one, consisting only of the negative obligation not to profit at the
expense of the corporation, must admit the difficulty of distinguishing
between a breach of the duty of loyalty182and a breach of the duty not to
receive an "improper personal benefit."'
At first glance, this seems like a good point. Clause (iv), however, does not
create a "duty not to receive an improper personal benefit"; it merely
provides that directors cannot be exculpated for transactions that result in
improper personal benefits. It is not difficult to imagine that a director who
has not been found to have violated the duty of loyalty-because they are
not conflicted (ex ante)-nevertheless could receive an improper personal
benefit (ex post). Thus, clause (iv) presents no difficulty. Its scope exceeds
that of the duty of loyalty. In short, it seems entirely fair to read section
102(b)(7) as permitting director exculpations except in cases of (i) breach
of the duty of loyalty, (ii) breach of the duty of good faith, (iii) improper
dividends, and (iv) other improper personal benefits.
Thus, the Delaware General Corporation Law provides support for the
existence of an independent duty of good faith. Although it does not
explicitly create the duty of good faith, neither does it explicitly create a
duty of care or loyalty. In each case, it assumes the existence of fiduciary
duties that, after all, are equitable rather than legal concepts.
181.

See DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 8,

§ 174

(2010).

182. Strine et al., supra note 12, at 660. Along the same lines, Strine elsewhere "[rleadily
[m]ake[s]" "[o]ne [l]inguistic [c]oncession": that "judges in particular have referred in the same
sentence or paragraph to both the words 'loyalty' and 'good faith,' leading to the argument that they
must be wholly distinct concepts and that one cannot be subsumed within the other." Id. at 653. He
claims, however, that this is mere "redundanc[y]" used "for emphasis and rhetorical flourish." Id. He
argues that this cannot be the basis for separating what is essentially the same concept, or else there
might be an infinite number of fiduciary duties. Id. at 653-55. Of course, whether good faith and loyalty
are essentially the same concept is the issue at hand. This argument, however, is best dealt with in a
subsequent section. See injfra Part IV.B.
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D. PLAUSIBILITY OF STRINE'S THESIS
Strine spends significant effort attempting to demonstrate that legal
usage of the terms good faith and loyalty are consistent with his theory.
Ultimately, Strine succeeds in creating a framework for the
conceptualization of fiduciary duties that is plausible, but by no means
compelling or definitive. The problem for Strine is that Eisenberg's
framework, consistent with the triadic formulation of fiduciary duties, is
also reasonable.
Close examination reveals that Strine's persuasiveness stems primarily
from the fact that he tells the reader what to look for before examining the
evidence. This approach is perfectly valid in that it makes it easier to
follow the argument. To a great extent, however, Strine's argument
depends on presenting the lens through which the reader can view the
evidence. Although Strine repeatedly asserts that his interpretations are
"clear,"' 1 83 independent review of the evidence (without Strine's gloss)
would not necessarily lead the reader to the same conclusions.
For example, Strine argues that "the term good faith has long been
used as the key element in defining the state of mind that must motivate a
loyal fiduciary." 184 It is understandable that he might think so. After all, the
primary components of good faith-honesty and sincerity-are states of
mind. Good faith, however, is not necessarily so limited. 185 It certainly
does not follow that good faith is merely a subset of the duty of loyalty.
That step requires a leap in logic that is facilitated by the lens that Strine
provides at the outset. Without this lens, Strine's work is merely an
argument in support of an alternative way of thinking about good faith.
The lens that Strine provides is a broad interpretation of the duty of
loyalty-as the duty to serve the legitimate interests of the corporationand a correspondingly narrow interpretation of the duty of good faith-as
the subjective component of loyalty. One just as easily could argue,
however, that loyalty is an objective component of good faith, 186 or that the
two are simply different. In fact, much of the evidence supplied by Strine
183. The terms "clear" and "clearly" are used throughout Strine's article. See Strine et al., supra
note 12.
184. Id. at 633.
185. For example, Eisenberg argues that good faith has a strong objective component. Eisenberg,
supra note 12, at 23. See also 5 OED, supra note 127, at 679 (stating that "the primary notion [of good
faith] seems to have been the objective aspect of confidence well or ill bestowed").
186.

See infra text accompanying note 243.
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highlights the importance of good faith in the law of fiduciary duties and
actually supports the claim that the duty of good faith is not subordinate to
loyalty, but equal or even superior to it.
To illustrate the point, I will reproduce many of the passages that
Strine quotes in support of his proposition, but without his
contextualizations. Notice that in none of the passages is good faith
represented as subordinate to or part of loyalty. To the contrary, loyalty is
not even mentioned in the majority of the following passages.
Consider first the passages quoted by Strine in his discussion of
agency law:
" "The paramount and vital principle of all agencies is good faith, for
without it the relation of principal and agent could not well
exist." 18 7
" "The relation existing between a principal and his agent is a
fiduciary one, and consequently the most absolute good faith is
essential. The principal relies upon the fidelity and integrity of the
agent, and it is the duty of the agent, in return, to be loyal to the
trust imposed in him, and to execute it with the single purpose of
' 188
advancing his principal's interests."
"

"It is the duty of the agent to exercise good faith and loyalty toward
'1 89
the principal in the transaction of the business entrusted to him."

From all of this, Strine concludes that "it is the agent's general duty to act
loyally-that is, in the interests of the principal-that gives rise to the more
specific duty to avoid taking positions in which the agent's interests are in
conflict with those of the principal."' 190 However, this conclusion depends
on the assumption that acting "in the interests of the principal" is the
demand of loyalty alone rather than of fiduciary duties generally, or of each
fiduciary duty in a particular way.1 91 On their own, the passages seem to
emphasize the importance of good faith rather than loyalty.
Consider next the passages quoted by Strine in his discussion of trust
law:
Strine et al., supra note 12, at 666 n.107 (quoting THE AMERICAN AND ENGLISH
187.
ENCYCLOPEDIA OF LAW 1071 (David S. Garland & Lucius P. McGehee eds., 2d ed. 1896)).
Id.(quoting ERNEST W. HUFFCuT, THE LAW OF AGENCY § 90 (2d ed. 1901)).
188.
189.
Id.(quoting FRANCES B. TIFFANY, HANDBOOK ON THE LAW OF PRINCIPAL AND AGENT § 146
(Richard R.B. Powell ed., 2d ed. 1924)).
190.
Id.
191.
See infra text accompanying note 313.
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" "There

are circumstances... [the trustee's financial selfinterest] which raise a presumption of bad faith on the part of the
92
trustee."1

* "Trustee Should Exercise Good Faith and Due Diligence in
193
Protection of Estate."'
"

"Absolute and most scrupulous good faith is the very essence of the
trustee's obligation. The first and principal duty arising from this
fiduciary relation is to act in all matters of the trust wholly for the
94
benefit of the beneficiary."1

Again, this evidence leads Strine to conclude that "the bond between
loyalty and good faith is inseparable."' 95 Standing alone, however, these
passages suggest that it is good faith, rather than loyalty, that demands that
the fiduciary act in the interests of the beneficiary.
Consider the passages quoted by Strine when he turns to corporations:
" "The underlying principles have not changed during the years.
Directors are held to two fundamental tests: (a) honesty and good
196
faith; [and] (b) diligence."'
" "[I]t is an implied condition that [the director's] discretion shall be
used in good faith for the benefit of the principal, and in
accordance with the true purpose of the agent's appointment .... It
is manifest, therefore, that the directors of a corporation occupy a
position of the highest trust and confidence, and that the utmost
good faith is required in the exercise of the powers conferred upon
them."' 97
" "[D]irectors 'must exercise the utmost good faith in all transactions
touching their duties to the corporation and its property'
and ... [a]ll their acts must be for the benefit of the corporation,
192. Strine et al., supra note 12, at 667 (alteration in original) (quoting Wormley v. Wormley, 21
U.S. (8 Wheat.) 421, 438 (1823)).
193. Id. (quoting 3 JOSEPH STORY, COMMENTARIES ON EQUITY JURISPRUDENCE AS
ADMINISTERED IN AMERICA § 1676 (14th ed. 1918)).

194. Id. at 667-68 (quoting 4 JOHN NORTON POMEROY, A TREATISE ON EQUITY JURISPRUDENCE
§ 1075 (5th ed. 1941)).
195. Id. at668.
196. Id. at 668 n.125 (alteration in original) (quoting I GEORGE D. HORNSTEIN, CORPORATION
LAW AND PRACTICE § 431 (1959) (citation omitted)).
197. Id. at 668-69 (ellipsis in original) (quoting I VICTOR MORAWETZ, A TREATISE ON THE LAW
OF PRIVATE CORPORATIONS § 516 (2d ed. 1886)).
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and not for their own benefit."' 198
* "Directors... of a corporation are liable to it for any loss which it
may sustain by reason of their refusal or failure to enter into a
contract for its benefit, if they do not act in good faith."1 99
Strine even quotes S. Samuel Arsht:
* "A director may also lose the benefit of the business judgment rule
if plaintiff proves that the director's challenged decision was
prompted by improper motive, that the director was not truly
independent from an interested party, or any other circumstance
demonstrating a lack of good faith."2 0
Again, Strine concludes that these passages demonstrate "the equivalence
of loyalty and good faith."2 1 A more straightforward reading of these
passages, however, suggests that good faith is a, and perhaps the,
paramount duty and that the avoidance of conflicts is a subset of that duty.
The case law that Strine quotes in the same section carries a similar
import20 2 :
* "[A director or officer] stands in a fiduciary relation which requires
him to exercise the utmost good faith in managing the business
affairs of the company with a view to promote, not his own
interests, but the common interests, and he cannot directly or
indirectly derive any personal benefit or advantage by reason of his
20 3
position distinct from the coshareholders."
" "A complete absence of selfish motive and of personal profit on
their part forcefully argues that [the directors']20 4judgment was
formed in absolute honesty and entire good faith.
198.

Id. at 669 (second alteration

in original) (quoting 2 SEYMOUR D. THOMPSON,

COMMENTARIES ON THE LAW OF PRIVATE CORPORATIONS § 1215, at 164 (2d ed. 1909)).
199.
Id. at 669 n.127 (quoting WILLIAM L. CLARK & WILLIAM L. MARSHALL, MARSHALL ON
PRIVATE CORPORATIONS 1010 (1902)).

200.

Id. at 672 (alteration omitted) (quoting S. Samuel Arsht, The Business Judgment Rule

Revisited, 8 HOFSTRA L. REV. 93, 127 (1979)). That Arsht does not see good faith and loyalty as the

same concept is evident from the fact that he deals with them separately, in different sections. See
Arsht, supra, at 115-18, 127-30.
201.

Id. at 668.

202.
I omit Guth because the case has already been discussed. See supra notes 30, 141-44 and
accompanying text.
203.
Strine et al., supra note 12, at 669 (alteration in original) (quoting Cahall v. Lofland, 114 A.
224, 228 (Del. Ch. 1921)).
204. Id. at 667 (alteration in original) (quoting Bodell v. Gen. Gas & Elec. Corp., 132 A. 442, 449
(Del. Ch. 1926)).
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Once again, these passages highlight the prominence of good faith, not
loyalty.
20 6
20 5
Strine's discussion of takeover cases-Cheff v. Mathes, Unocal,
and Revlon 2 7-- is similar.2" 8 He shows that courts demand that directors
of the corporation, but not that good
act in good faith in the best interests
20 9
loyalty.
of
duty
the
of
part
is
faith
I am not arguing that good faith is superior to loyalty. I believe that
they are equal in stature. My point is only that Strine's evidence does not
support his claim that loyalty is superior to, and encompasses, good faith.
At most, Strine only shows that loyalty, fidelity, faithfulness, and good
it entails many
faith are related terms.2 10 While this is self-evident,
2 11
ramifications.
and
explanations
possible
different
E. CONCLUSION ON SEMANTICS

Ultimately, the issue of the relation between good faith and loyalty is
not one that can or should be resolved by etymology, linguistics, or other
semantic arguments. This is because good faith is a legal term that must be
given meaning by way of artificial construction. To some extent the legal
term will track common usage, but to some extent it will not. Moreover,
courts sometimes use the term in a legalistic sense and sometimes use it in
the more common sense; sometimes, they will switch between the two
senses in the same discussion. What is needed is a framework that is not
merely plausible, but one that is also elucidating. And that will not be
found by reference to intuitiveness. Common usage gives us a starting
205. Cheffv. Mathes, 199 A.2d 548 (Del. 1964).
206. Unocal Corp. v. Mesa Petroleum Co., 493 A.2d 946 (Del. 1985).
207. Revlon, Inc. v. MacAndrews & Forbes Holdings, Inc., 506 A.2d 173 (Del. 1986).
208. Strine et al., supra note 12, at 670-72.
209. Strine claims that the following passage from Revlon "explicitly demonstrates the use of
good faith to define the core mandate of loyalty, which is to act solely in the interest of the corporation
and its stockholders," id. at 672: "[O]btaining the highest price for the benefit of the stockholders
should have been the central theme guiding director action. Thus, the Revlon board could not make the
requisite showing of good faith by preferring the noteholders and ignoring its duty of loyalty to the
shareholders," Revlon, 506 A.2d at 182. In fact, this passage is perfectly consistent with the notion that
good faith is superior to loyalty. It says that directors could not show good faith because they ignored
loyalty; it does not say they could not show loyalty because they were not acting in good faith.
210. Lyman Johnson shows that care is closely related as well. See infra notes 231-39 and
accompanying text.
211. As will be discussed more fully in the next part, good faith, loyalty, and care (as well as
objectivity and rationality) are all aspects of one core fiduciary duty: to pursue the interests of the
corporation and its shareholders.
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point, but the legal definition must ultimately be based on functional
considerations as well.
IV. HOW TO THINK ABOUT FIDUCIARY DUTIES
In Part III, I argued that the current debate has improperly
concentrated on semantic arguments. What is needed is a framework that
will provide a solid and stable foundation for courts and practitioners. In
this part, I hope to provide such a framework.
In a 2007 essay, Hill and McDonnell argue that fiduciary duties can be
understood at varying levels of abstraction. 212 This crucial insight helps
explain the relationship among the various fiduciary duties. Most
importantly, it highlights the fact that the answer to the question of how
many fiduciary duties there are in corporate law can be virtually any
number, depending on the level of abstraction considered. Thus, there is no
single correct answer. Any answer may be correct in some respects, but
none is accurate in every respect. In this part, I argue that, if the question
must be asked, the best answer is five: distinguishing among fiduciary
duties based on the paradigms for enforcement is most likely to lead to
meaningful distinctions without risk of confusion.
In Section A, I explain the concept of levels of abstraction. In Section
B, I explain how, at the highest level of abstraction, there is only one
fiduciary duty. I argue that this fundamental duty is different from any of
the particular fiduciary duties and comprises all of them. In Section C, I
demonstrate that it is possible to move with increasing specificity to almost
any number of fiduciary duties. In Section D, I argue that the most helpful
level of abstraction is what I call the third level. This level distinguishes
among the paradigms for enforcement of fiduciary duties. In Section E, I
argue that simplifying the law so that there are two fiduciary duties can
lead to oversimplification, and doing so risks collapsing the five paradigms
for enforcement into two, resulting in a loss of precision and nuance. In
Section F, I argue that the inherent complexity of the law of fiduciary
duties makes it difficult to organize them along a single linear continuum,
and that a better way of conceptualizing fiduciary duties is as a Venn
diagram. Such an image highlights the fact that fiduciary duties are not
entirely independent of each other but have significant overlap. In Section
G, I explain the nature of the overlap. I argue that the determination of
which fiduciary duty is involved in a case corresponds not to director
212.

Hill & McDonnell, supra note 13, at 1788-91.
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conduct, as is commonly believed, but rather to the shareholders' concerns
about the conduct. Thus, a director's actions may implicate any or all of the
fiduciary duties, depending on the circumstances and the available
evidence. I conclude in Section H with a summary.
A. LEVELS OF ABSTRACTION
Hill and McDonnell have described fiduciary duties as follows:
Director duties, and breaches thereof, fall along a continuum. There
are stylized cases at both ends, where the procedures have been well
developed. Care, with its very strong deference, which essentially
translates into "plaintiff loses" (and even if he did not lose, there would
be exculpation), is at one extreme. Traditional loyalty, where the
defendant has to show good process (in the form of approval by
disinterested and fully informed directors, shareholders, or both) or,
failing that, very good substance (that is, "entire" or "intrinsic" fairness),
is at the other extreme. Of most interest here are the cases that fall
between these extremes, where we think good faith will increasingly
become part of the doctrinal story.
In dividing up the cases along this continuum, we can think at varying
levels of abstraction ....

At the very highest level, there is just one

fiduciary duty-to pursue faithfully and diligently the best interests of
the corporation and its shareholders. Below this level of abstraction, we
can see the continuum of cases as divided into the two traditional
categories, care and loyalty. Why divide the cases this way? As we
discuss above and below, we put into the care category circumstances
where we want courts to largely avoid scrutinizing board behavior, such
that it is extremely unlikely that directors will ever be held personally
liable. Loyalty cases deserve at least a bit of (and sometimes quite a bit
of) a closer look from courts.
One level of abstraction below that, we divide the loyalty category
into two parts. One part, at the extreme end, is traditional loyalty cases,
where directors or officers have a pecuniary material interest that
conflicts with the interests of the corporation. The other part is good
faith. This includes the intermediate cases that fall between traditional
care and traditional loyalty. Why is this division of the broad loyalty
category useful? Cases presenting facts that fall in the traditional loyalty
category clearly deserve close scrutiny from some sort of independent
decision maker, be it independent directors, shareholders, or the courts.
We have well-established rules for these sorts of cases. Good faith is a
more nebulous category. It includes many different kinds of factual
circumstances, united by the fact that we have some reason to be
concerned about director objectivity (hence, they are not care cases), but
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the stark concerns of traditional conflicts of interest are not present
(hence, they are not traditional loyalty cases). It is thus useful to
distinguish good faith from traditional loyalty.
If we then descend one more level of abstraction, we find that the
good faith region in turn subdivides at present into a variety of different
factual circumstances and related standards of review. The more specific
standards of review give structured guidance to courts, corporations, and
their counselors where the facts fall within the scope of those specific
standards. The general backdrop of good faith gives courts flexibility to
deal with new circumstances that do not fit within better defined
standards of review, and to develop new specific standards for other sorts
of cases where appropriate.213
The insight that fiduciary duties can be understood at varying levels of
abstraction is a crucial one. It can help explain and reconcile judicial
opinions and scholarly theories that appear incompatible. It also provides a
robust intellectual framework within which both judges and scholars can
work. The increased intellectual latitude allows for the discovery of new
insights regarding fiduciary duties while leading to the realization that no
single perspective has an exclusive lock on the truth. Many different
theories may be true to a point, but ultimately are inadequate in some
respects. What rings true at one level of abstraction may seem wrong at
another level.
Unfortunately, Hill and McDonnell develop their theory improperly.
Three related errors prove fatal. First, they position the duty of good faith
within the duty of loyalty.2 14 This is to be expected because their essay is
an attempt to deal with the recent case of Stone. Second, they position good
215
faith in between care and loyalty as a sort of intermediate fiduciary duty.
As I will demonstrate, however, good faith does not lie between care and
loyalty, but rather at the extreme. Third, they describe fiduciary duties as
falling along a linear continuum.2 16 As I will argue in the following
sections, this provides an inadequate understanding of fiduciary duties,
which are significantly more complex.
The claim that good faith lies between care and loyalty dates back to
2 17
an earlier article in which Hill and McDonnell tackle structural bias.
213.

Id.at 1788-89 (footnotes omitted).

214.

See id. at 1789.

215.

Seeid. at 1791.

216.

Seeid. at 1788.

217.

See Hill & McDonnell, supra note 49.
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Their thesis is understandable. There is significant intermediate ground
between care and loyalty and, as I have argued in earlier work, it has to do
primarily with structural bias. 218 Moreover, the duty of good faith is an
emerging area of law that is somewhat "nebulous" 2 9 because it has not yet
been defined very well. Thus, it is not surprising that Hill and McDonnell
would turn to good faith to deal with structural bias. The intermediate
ground that they identify, however, is not good faith.
Good faith is about intentional misconduct. 221 Structural bias is not.
Structural bias is about subtle influences that affect the decisionmaking
process, often unconsciously. 221 These influences are essentially conflicts
of interest that do not rise to the level of self-dealing. Even in cases
involving self-dealing, there need not be any actual misconduct-that is
why the law gives directors the opportunity to prove fairness. 222 Because
process,
these influences undermine confidence in the decisionmaking
223
review.
heightened
to
subjected
are
decisions
tainted
however,
Moreover, the standards of review that are employed in cases of
structural bias and those involving good faith are entirely dissimilar.
Structural bias invokes the third paradigm for the enforcement of fiduciary
duties. Such cases are subjected to an intermediate standard of reviewreasonableness-which lies somewhere between the leniency given to care
cases and the strictness accorded to loyalty cases.2 24 Good faith, on the
other hand, invokes the fourth paradigm. In such cases, the shareholders
bear the heavy burden of establishing intentional misconduct.2 25 This is
significantly more onerous than reasonableness, or even gross
226
negligence.
In short, Hill and McDonnell are wrong to identify the duty of good
faith with the intermediate standards of review and structural bias. In doing
so, they conflate the third and fourth paradigms for the enforcement of
218. See Velasco, supra note 19.
219. See Hill & McDonnell, supra note 13, at 1789 (describing good faith as "a more nebulous
category").
220. See supra notes 78-86 and accompanying text.
221. See Velasco, supranote 19, at 853-65.
222. See supra notes 45-47 and accompanying text.
223. See Velasco, supra note 19, at 874.
224. See supra Part II.C,
225. See supra Part l.D.
226. In re The Walt Disney Co. Derivative Litig., 906 A.2d 27, 65 (Del. 2006) ("[G]rossly
negligent conduct, without more, does not and cannot constitute a breach of the fiduciary duty to act in
good faith.").
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fiduciary duties, which are actually very different from each other. I will
explore the levels of abstraction with these differences in mind.
B. ONE FUNDAMENTAL FIDUCIARY DUTY

As to their first step, Hill and McDonnell are clearly correct: "At the
very highest level, there is just one fiduciary duty-to pursue.., the best
interests of the corporation and its shareholders." 22 7 This should not be
controversial: Strine agrees, 228 and I can think of no reason why Eisenberg
would not. Nevertheless, the exact nature of this one fundamental fiduciary
duty is controversial.
According to both Strine and Hill and McDonnell, the one
fundamental fiduciary duty is, essentially, the duty of loyalty. 229 They view
the duty of loyalty as a broad mandate to pursue the interests of the
corporation, and everything else as falling within its expansive scope.
There is one important, if technical, problem with this view: if every breach
of fiduciary duty were a breach of the duty of loyalty, then no breach of
fiduciary duty would be exculpable under section 102(b)(7). 23 ° Setting
aside that issue, however, the claim seems plausible on its face. Yet other
theories also are reasonable.
In an article about the duty of care, Lyman Johnson sets forth the
foundation for a claim that the one fundamental fiduciary duty is the duty
of care. 231 He argues that "[f]ar from being a simple concept, care is
multidimensional," with "[a]t least three meanings." 232 First, directors are
required to "'take care of the corporation's business and affairs."233
Second, a board must "'care for' the interests of the corporate enterprise
and its shareholders, .... not the directors' interests or those of any other
227. Hill & McDonnell, supra note 13, at 1788.
228. See Strine et al., supra note 12, at 635 ("[I]t is possible to conceive of there being only one
core duty .... ").
229. See id. at 635 ("We are willing to go further and to say that it is possible to conceive of there
being only one core duty, that of loyalty, and that the duty of care is itself simply a component of what
is expected of a faithful-that is, loyal-fiduciary."); Hill & McDonnell, supra note 13, at 1779 (citing
Hill & McDonnell, supra note 49, at 855) ("[W]e think the duty of care was always fundamentally a
duty of loyalty.").
230. See DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 8, § 102(b)(7) (2010); supra text accompanying note 170 (quoting
DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 8, § 102(b)(7)).
231. See Lyman Johnson, Rethinking Judicial Review of Director Care, 24 DEL. J. CORP. L. 787,
808-09 (1999). Johnson does not himself argue that care is the one core duty. His argument, however,
provides support for such a claim.
232. Id. at 808.
233. Id.
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235
party., 234 Third, "directors are to act 'carefully' or in a careful manner."

Such a broad understanding of the duty of care subsumes the other
fiduciary duties. In Johnson's words, the second meaning, "care as
is the
solicitude for the interests of the enterprise and shareholders[,]
236
faith.
good
and
loyalty
of
notions
the
of
foundation
Aronson v. Lewis 237 lends some support to Johnson's argument. 23 8 Its
classic formulation of the duty of care provides that a director must not
only become informed but also put the information to good use. 239 This
formulation implicitly recognizes that the standard of conduct (as opposed
to the standard of review) for the duty of care is not concerned solely with
empty procedural formalities. Instead, the duty of care is about meaningful
decisionmaking, which is aided by process but requires more. It requires an
openness to the process that is incompatible with insincerity and conflicts
of interest. Thus, if the understanding of the duty of care is sufficiently
broad, it can encompass the duties of good faith and loyalty.
It would be equally possible to argue that the one fundamental duty is
the duty of good faith. 240 After all, the core duty of pursuing the interests of
the corporation and its shareholders is perfectly consistent with the duty of
good faith, which, broadly understood, is to pursue the interests of the
corporation and its shareholders honestly and sincerely, and without
intentional misconduct of any kind. Moreover, as demonstrated earlier,
much of the law's discussion of fiduciary duties revolves around the notion
of good faith.24 1
Good faith is the indispensible prerequisite to the fulfillment of
234. Id.
235. Id.
236. Id. at 808-09.
237. Aronson v. Lewis, 473 A.2d 805 (Del. 1984).
238. See Johnson, supra note 231, at 806.
239. See Aronson, 473 A.2d at 812 ("[D]irectors have a duty to inform themselves, prior to
making a business decision, of all material information reasonably available to them. Having become so
informed, they must then act with the requisite care in the discharge of their duties."), overruled on
other groundsby Brehm v. Eisner, 746 A.2d 244, 254 (Del. 2000).
240. The central importance of good faith can be highlighted by the following anecdote:
In the 1960s, when Delaware was revising its corporation law, Samuel Arsht, a leading figure
of the Delaware corporate bar, is said to have proposed that the law be simplified to the
following principle: Directors of Delaware corporations can do anything they want, as long as
it is not illegal, and as long as they act in good faith.
Edward B. Rock, Saints and Sinners: How Does Delaware CorporateLaw Work?, 44 UCLA L. REV.
1009, 1015 (1997).
241. See supra notes 75-77, 185-209 and accompanying text.
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fiduciary duties. 24 2 In fact, it is possible to view the other fiduciary duties
as proxies for good faith. A shareholder can always prevail by establishing
bad faith on the part of directors. Bad faith is extremely difficult to prove,
however. Thus, the duty of care and the duty of loyalty can be seen as tools
to ascertain whether the directors are acting in good faith. Of course,
merely being careless or conflicted does not, in itself, indicate bad faith;
but neither does it result in a breach of fiduciary duty. However, when a
director is exceedingly careless-that is, grossly negligent--or has a
material conflict and cannot establish that the transaction is fair, there is a
reasonable inference that his actions have not been taken in the utmost
good faith. In other words, gross negligence and unfairness can be
considered objective signs of bad faith.243 When they are established,
directors are held liable as if they had acted in bad faith.
Of course, Strine would take issue with such arguments. According to
the Vice Chancellor,
There might be situations when a director acts in subjective good faith
and is yet not loyal (e.g., if the director is interested in a transaction
subject to the entire fairness standard and cannot prove financial
fairness), but there is no case in which a director can act in subjective
bad faith towards the corporation and act loyally [because a director
acting in bad faith is not being loyal to the corporation] .244
Strine believes this proves that good faith is a subset of loyalty. It does not.
The same thing could be said of the relationship between the duties of care
and good faith: there might be situations in which a director acts in
subjective good faith and is yet not careful (for example, if the director has
the intent to benefit the corporation and is grossly negligent), but there is
no case in which a director can act in subjective bad faith toward the
corporation and act with care (because a director acting in bad faith is not
caring for the corporation).24 5 Thus, good faith is more than merely a subset
of loyalty. It may be a subset of both care and loyalty, but a more
reasonable conclusion would be that good faith is different from and yet
related to both.24 6
242.
See supra notes 166-67 and accompanying text.
243.
Cf supra text accompanying note 186.
244.
Guttman v. Huang, 823 A.2d 492, 506 n.34 (Del. Ch. 2003). "A director cannot act loyally
towards the corporation unless she acts in the good faith belief that her actions are in the corporation's
best interest." Id.; Stone ex reL. AmSouth Bankcorporation v. Ritter, 911 A.2d 362, 370 (Del. 2006)
(quoting Guttman, 823 A.2d at 506 n.34).
245.
Cf Johnson, supra note 231, at 808-09.
246.
Cf infra text accompanying note 319.
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The problem with these claims is that, with a slight tweaking of
definitions, the statements can be reversed. All that is required is that good
faith be interpreted broadly and that care and loyalty be interpreted more
narrowly. Then it reasonably could be said that (1) there might be situations
in which a director acts loyally and yet does not act in good faith (for
example, if the director is not interested in the transaction but engages in
intentional misconduct), but there is no case in which a director can act
disloyally toward the corporation and act in good faith (because a director
who is disloyal is not acting in good faith); and (2) there might be
situations in which a director acts carefully and yet does not act in good
faith (for example, if the director follows appropriate procedures but
engages in intentional misconduct), but there is no case in which a director
can act carelessly toward the corporation and act in good faith (because a
director who is careless is not acting in good faith). The plausibility of
these statements, like the plausibility of the earlier statements, depends on a
willingness to generalize and ignore details.
This demonstrates that such arguments are nothing more than
semantics. Just as fiduciary duties generally can be viewed at different
levels of abstraction, so too can individual duties be viewed at different
levels of abstraction. This conceptual flexibility is what allows one duty to
be portrayed as superior to, and encompassing, the others. Because each
duty can be characterized broadly or narrowly, however, such claims are
inherently unreliable.
I argued above that it was equally possible to consider any of the
particular fiduciary duties as the one fundamental duty. The best way to
think about the one fundamental duty, however, is to view it as something
247
different from any of them; or rather, as comprising all of them.
Conceptually, this single fundamental fiduciary duty can be broken down
in different ways at different levels of abstraction depending on the need.
Ultimately, the various duties are all related precisely because they are all
aspects of the one fundamental fiduciary duty.2 48
247. Cf In re The Walt Disney Co. Derivative Litig., 907 A.2d 693, 755 (Del. Ch. 2005)
("Fundamentally, the duties traditionally analyzed as belonging to corporate fiduciaries, loyalty and
care, are but constituent elements of the overarching concepts of allegiance, devotion and faithfulness
that must guide the conduct of every fiduciary.").
248. See infra text accompanying note 313.
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C. LEVELS OF SPECIFICITY

Beyond the one fundamental fiduciary duty, there are many
possibilities. 249 Both Strine and Hill and McDonnell suggest that the next
step bifurcates fiduciary duties into care and loyalty based on the potential
for director liability. 25 ° This type of bifurcation seems perfectly reasonable.
What is more questionable is the decision to label the categories "care" and
"loyalty." It is true that care and traditional loyalty fit those descriptions,
but it assumes the conclusion to say that everything in the former category
is the duty of care and everything in the latter category is the duty of
loyalty. To determine whether that is the case, further consideration is
necessary.
The distinction at this second level of abstraction technically is quite
small. According to Hill and McDonnell,
we put into the care category circumstances where we want courts to
largely avoid scrutinizing board behavior, such that it is extremely
unlikely that directors will ever be held personally liable. Loyalty cases
deserve 5at1 least a bit of (and sometimes quite a bit of) a closer look from
courts.

2

This suggests that the key distinction concerns the level of judicial scrutiny.
That is not quite accurate, however. Whether or not it is a subset of loyalty,
the duty of good faith certainly belongs in the same category at the second
level of abstraction. Yet good faith does not get nearly the level of scrutiny
that loyalty does. From the director's perspective, the review for good faith
is quite lenient, 2 while review for loyalty is quite demanding. Nor is the
distinction based on the possibility of personal liability. After all, the duty
of care can lead to liability as well, unless the shareholders have adopted a
director exculpation amendment to the corporate charter. 253 The distinction
249. It is worth noting that moving along the spectrum of abstraction/specificity is not discrete,
but continuous. Thus, it is inappropriate to number the levels of abstraction or to refer to them as the
"next" or "previous" level. They should be referred to as "different" levels of abstraction in order to
acknowledge that there may be other possibilities along the way. Nevertheless, for the sake of
convenience, I will refer to the first three levels of abstraction that I discuss as the first, second, and
third level, respectively. I do not mean to suggest that they are objectively the first, second, and third
levels of abstraction.
250. See Hill & McDonnell, supra note 13, at 1788-89; Strine et al., supra note 12, at 634.
251. Hill & McDonnell, supranote 13, at 1789.
252. This is true as an initial matter. If the shareholders manage to rebut the presumption of the
business judgment rule, however, then the burden that shifts to the directors is quite demanding. See
supranotes 88-96 and accompanying text.
253. See DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 8, § 102(b)(7) (2010).
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is actually a narrow one, described by Strine as "distinguish[ing] between
two forms of director conduct: (1) conduct that ...should be remediable by
(2) conduct that involves an
an award of monetary damages, 25 and
4
exculpable or indemnifiable breach.
I would characterize the distinction at the second level of abstraction
differently. I believe that the second level distinguishes between situations
in which directors merely drop the ball-for example, because they were
careless-and those in which directors do something worse-whether they
engage in actual misconduct or simply put themselves in a situation where
misconduct is more likely. 255 This happens to correspond very well to the
likelihood of liability. Although it is a bit more vague, it is also more
meaningful.
According to Hill and McDonnell, "One level of abstraction below
that, we divide the loyalty category into two parts. One part... is
traditional loyalty cases ....The other part is good faith., 256 This third
level of abstraction is consistent with the now-defunct triad of fiduciary
duties. It is important to notice that at this level of abstraction, Strine and
Hill and McDonnell are in agreement with Eisenberg. The difference is
primarily one of semantics. They all agree, more or less, 257 that there are
three categories of duties which, at least colloquially, could be labeled care,
loyalty, and good faith.2 58 The difference is that Strine and Hill and
McDonnell would apply the label "duty of loyalty" at the second level and
say that traditional loyalty and good faith are both subsets, while Eisenberg
might (and I would) apply the label "duty of loyalty" at this third level,
making traditional loyalty and good faith independent of each other and on
equal footing with care.
Subsequent levels of specificity may be characterized in many
different ways. 25 9 Because the current debate focuses on the first three
254. Strine etal.,
supra note 12, at 634.
255. See infra text accompanying note 276.
256. Hill & McDonnell, supranote 13, at 1789.
257. The parties disagree on the exact content of good faith. Where Strine would make it entirely
subjective, see Strine et al., supra note 12, at 644, 695-96, Eisenberg would include a significant
objective component, see Eisenberg, supra note 12, at 23, 72. In an even more significant departure,
Hill and McDonnell would make it "the vast middle ground" which would cover structural bias. See
Hill & McDonnell, supra note 13, at 1770.
258. According to the Stone court, "good faith may be described colloquially as part of a 'triad' of
fiduciary duties that includes the duties of care and loyalty." Stone ex rel. AmSouth Bancorporation v.
Ritter, 911 A.2d 362, 370 (Del 2006).
259. According to Hill and McDonnell, "If we then descend one more level of abstraction, we find
that the good faith region in turn subdivides at present into a variety of different factual circumstances
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levels of abstraction, I will offer only brief thoughts. A fourth level of
abstraction might spell out the contents of each particular duty. For
example, according to the Disney court, the duty of good faith may consist
of the duties to avoid intentional misconduct, intentional violation of law,
and conscious disregard of duties, among other things. 260 According to
Strine, the duty of care may include the duties of "informedness, prudence,
advisedness, preparedness, and diligence." 261 Likewise, the duty of loyalty
may consist of the duties to not engage in a self-dealing transaction, to
avoid other material conflicts, and to not misappropriate a corporate
opportunity. 262 A fifth level could go even further and specify the particular
conduct requirements of each duty. Thus, for example, the duty of
informedness might include the duties to gather all information that is
already available, to use reasonable efforts to generate new information, to
read reports, and to participate in board meetings. Subsequent levels could
go into even greater specificity. At some point, there is a move beyond the
level of general principle, and even specific conduct can be considered a
fiduciary duty. Thus, for example, it could be said that, in Van Gorkom, the
directors had a fiduciary duty to meet for more than two hours. 263 That
"duty" was particular to that case, however, and it is not a fair statement of
law to say that board meetings generally must last more than two hours.
The insight that fiduciary duties can be viewed at different levels of
abstraction helps to explain theories about fiduciary duties that seem to
conflict. For example, it reveals that Strine and Eisenberg are not that far
apart after all. It also reveals that the question about the precise number of
fiduciary duties in corporate law is misleading and ultimately irrelevant. It
can be fair to say that there is only one fiduciary duty, or that there are two,
or three, or almost any number. It would even be fair to say that there are
dozens, or hundreds, or even thousands of duties at sufficiently low levels
and related standards of review." Hill & McDonnell, supra note 13, at 1789. As I argued earlier, see
supra notes 220-26 and accompanying text, Hill and McDonnell misunderstand the concept of good
faith and conflate it with bias. As I will show in the next section, bias is an independent category that
deserves equal footing on the third level of abstraction. Thus, much of the work that Hill and
McDonnell ascribe to the fourth level of abstraction is actually accomplished in my (modified) third
level.
260. See In re The Walt Disney Co. Derivative Litig., 906 A.2d 27, 67 (Del. 2006); supra text
accompanying note 80 (quoting Disney, 906 A.2d at 67).
261. Strine et al., supranote 12, at 654-55 (footnotes omitted).
262. See, e.g., Orman v. Cullman, 794 A.2d 5, 23 (Del. Ch. 2002); Solomon v. Armstrong, 747
A.2d 1098, 1112-13 (Del. Ch. 1999).
263. See Smith v. Van Gorkom, 488 A.2d 858, 874 (Del. 1985), overruled on other grounds by
Gantler v. Stephens, 965 A.2d 695, 713 n.54 (Del. 2009).
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of abstraction. Each claim can be true in some respects without making the
others wrong in other respects. Of course, in the hands of any capable
jurist, it is all irrelevant. As long as the necessary distinctions are
preserved-especially the five paradigms for the enforcement of fiduciary
duties-it does not matter how the fiduciary duties are numbered or
categorized. It is simply a matter of preference.
There are at least two remaining problems that must be dealt with. The
framework discussed so far does not seem to account for everything. For
example, it does not deal well with hybrid concepts such as bias and
intermediate standards of review. I address this concern in the next section.
Perhaps more problematic are duties such as the duty of disclosure. Where
does such a duty fit in? It has alternatively been described as fitting in with
care, loyalty, good faith, or all three. 264 Is this a separate duty, and if not,
how should it be dealt with? I address this concern in a subsequent section.
D. FIVE FIDUCIARY DUTIES

Thus far, I have argued that at the highest level of abstraction, there is
only one fiduciary duty; at a slightly lower level, there is a bifurcation of
fiduciary duties; and at a third level, there is the triad of fiduciary dutiescare, loyalty, and good faith. Essentially, the current debate, manifested in
the exchange between Strine and Eisenberg, has been about which level of
abstraction-the second or the third-is the most appropriate level for
discussions of fiduciary duties and for assigning labels such as the duty of
loyalty. Is the important distinction that of the second level, such that
exculpable duties ought to be labeled the duty of care and all
nonexculpable duties the duty of loyalty, or is the more meaningful level
the third level, such that a triad of fiduciary duties is more sensible?
There is no doubt that a distinction concerning the potential for
liability, like the one at the second level, is an important one. 265 The
264. See, e.g., Malone v. Brincat, 722 A.2d 5, 11 (Del. 1998) ("The duty of directors to observe
proper disclosure requirements derives from the combination of the fiduciary duties of care, loyalty, and
good faith."); Zirn v. VLI Corp., 621 A.2d 773, 778 (Dcl. 1993) ("The requirement that a director
disclose to shareholders all material facts bearing upon a merger vote arises under the duties of care and
loyalty." (citing Weinberger v. UOP, Inc., 457 A.2d 701 (Del. 1983))); O'Reilly v. Transworld

Healthcare, Inc., 745 A.2d 902, 914-15 (Del. Ch. 1999) ("A claim for breach of the fiduciary duty of
disclosure implicates only the duty of care when the factual basis for the alleged violation suggests that
the violation was made as a result of a good faith, but nevertheless, erroneous judgment about the
proper scope or content of the required disclosure.").

265. It would be better if the distinction were about the amount of scrutiny and the possibility of
liability rather than merely about exculpability and indemnifiability, see supra notes 251-56 and
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question is whether it is the most important feature to highlight. On the one
hand, it probably is the distinction that is of greatest concern to
shareholders and directors alike. On the other hand, it is a highly simplistic
distinction, and one that does not tell us very much about the fiduciary
duties themselves. Most of the information derived from the second level
of abstraction comes not from the distinction itself but from the label
assigned to the distinction. Differentiating among duties that can and
cannot be exculpated tells us only that some breaches of fiduciary duty are
worse than others. It does not tell us how they are worse or how much
worse. The labels "care" and "loyalty" are what begin to convey some
substantive meaning. Because the term loyalty would be defined
capaciously, however, it does not tell us much more than that it is somehow
worse than carelessness.

266

Compare that with the third level. The triadic formulation tells us
significantly more about the fiduciary duties themselves. It distinguishes
among cases in which directors are negligent-care-those in which
directors engage in misconduct-good faith-and those in which directors
may or may not have engaged in any misconduct, but in which there can be
no confidence in their judgment because they are conflicted-loyalty.
Moreover, the third level does not sacrifice much of the simplicity of the
second level. It is not very difficult to remember that good faith and loyalty
violations are more likely to lead to liability than care violations. Thus, the
third level seems to have a descriptive advantage over the second level
without much trade off.
And yet, as noted earlier, there is a problem at the third level of
abstraction. The triadic formulation does not adequately deal with the
complexity of fiduciary duties, especially structural bias and the
intermediate standards of review. Hill and McDonnell attempt to deal with
this problem at a fourth level of abstraction, as a subset of good faith. As I
argued earlier, however, they are mistaken about the nature of good faith,
which is completely different from structural bias. 267 Of course, it would be
possible to locate structural bias within good faith arbitrarily, but that
would raise two difficulties. First, the tidy continuum would be destroyed,
accompanying text, but it is nevertheless an important distinction. Moreover, as I have suggested, the
real distinction focuses not on liability, but on other factors that have ramifications for liability. See
supra Part IV.C.
266. My characterization of the second level of abstraction is somewhat more descriptive than
exculpability, but only about as much as the labels "care" and "loyalty."
267.

See supra notes 217-25 and accompanying text.
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because good faith and structural bias are not located near each other on the
spectrum. Second, an unnecessary layer of complexity would be
introduced. Already, bifurcation requires Strine and Hill and McDonnell to
explain that there are two duties, care and loyalty, but that loyalty can be
divided into traditional loyalty and good faith. Structural bias requires that
good faith be further divided into intentional misconduct and bias. Thus,
rather than a simple list of fiduciary duties, there is a complex structure
resembling an outline:
1. care
2. loyalty
a. traditional loyalty
b. good faith
i. intentional misconduct
ii. structural bias
The sole benefit of this convoluted structure is to highlight the distinction
between exculpable and nonexculpable duties.
The problem posed by structural bias can be resolved much more
easily, by recognizing that the essence of the third level of abstraction is
not the triadic formulation itself, but rather the paradigms for the
enforcement of fiduciary duties. A paradigm-centered approach is
compatible with the triadic formulation, but extends it. In addition to care
(which corresponds to the first paradigm), loyalty (which corresponds to
the second paradigm), and good faith (which corresponds to the fourth
paradigm), there are two more components (which correspond to the third
and fifth paradigms). This approach further distinguishes among cases in
which directors are not financially conflicted but are nevertheless
structurally biased, and those in which directors make an irrational
decision. In this Article, I refer to the latter category as "rationality," and
the former category as "objectivity."26' 8
This approach shifts the terms of the discussion. Scholars and jurists
have been debating whether there are two fiduciary duties or three, but my
analysis suggests that a better answer may be five. Thus, it could be said
that there is a duty of care, which covers process; a duty of loyalty, which
covers conflicts; a duty of good faith, which covers intentional misconduct;
a duty of objectivity, which covers bias; and a duty of rationality, which
268.

By the term objectivity, I mean nothing more than not influenced by (structural) bias.
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covers substance. 26 9 Admittedly, my approach seems more complex than I
would like it to be. Any complexity is merely superficial, however.
Moreover, it is unavoidable under the existing law.
A more important criticism is that my approach may seem far-fetched.
Are "objectivity" and "rationality" truly fiduciary duties on a par with good
faith, as well as care and loyalty? Is it even fair to say that there are duties
to avoid structural bias and waste?
A duty to avoid waste does not seem too much of a stretch. Courts
may not like to review the substance of business decisions, but this concern
is reflected in an extremely lenient standard of review. A duty to avoid
structural bias, on the other hand, is more problematic. One of the central
claims about structural bias is that it is not avoidable; it is a manifestation
of a psychological phenomenon known as ingroup bias. 270 Surely the law
cannot require directors to do the impossible. However, my proposed "duty
of objectivity" is not exactly a duty to avoid structural bias. Rather, it is a
obligation to be
duty to be aware of structural bias and a corresponding
271
objectively reasonable under the circumstances.
The concern underlying the duty of objectivity is similar to that
underlying the duty of loyalty, but it is different in two important respects.
First, it is less direct and severe. Directors may be conflicted, but the
conflict does not rise to the level of self-dealing. This is why less is
required of directors to escape breach-not entire fairness, but only
reasonableness. 272 Second, it is not a situation that can be avoided. Whereas
directors can avoid self-dealing transactions altogether and abstain in other
situations involving a conflict, structural bias involves situations that are
not created by directors. 273 Because directors cannot avoid structural bias,
they must remain aware of it and deal with it reasonably. Thus, although
objectivity sounds like a subset of loyalty, it more closely resembles care in
terms of culpability. This is why I have argued in earlier work that breaches
of the duty of objectivity probably should be exculpable.27 4 Shareholders
269. See supratbl.
270. See Velasco, supranote 19, at 860-65.
271. See supratbl.
272. See Velasco, supranote 19, at 825.
273. See id. at 824-25.
274. See id. at 914-16. The Delaware Supreme Court decision in Lyondell Chemical Co. v. Ryan,
970 A.2d 235, 243-44 (Del. 2009), arguably provides support for this position. In that case, which
involved Revlon duties, the directors were held to have not breached the duty of loyalty because they
had not "knowingly and completely failed to undertake their responsibilities." At most, they had
breached only the duty of care, and thus were protected by the exculpation provision in the corporate
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should be relegated to injunctive relief.275 Because the duty of objectivity
lies directly between the duties of care and loyalty, the question of
exculpability is a close one and reasonable people can disagree. I maintain,
however, that the duty of objectivity is a situation in which directors have
dropped the ball (by not acting reasonably in the face of bias), rather than
having done something worse (such as intentionally engaging in
misconduct or putting themselves in a situation where misconduct is more
likely).2 76 For this reason, it would be more appropriate to place the duty of
objectivity, at the second level of abstraction, on the duty-of-care side of
the divide.
Somewhat counterintuitively, 277 I believe that the duty of rationality
belongs on the loyalty side of the divide. The concept of rationality is often
described as a duty of substantive care.2 78 Moreover, a bad decision seems
more like poor judgment than something worse. As I have pointed out,
however, the duty of rationality does not make much sense unless it is
understood as a proxy for the duty of good faith. 279 As a result, it should be
treated in the same way as good faith. 28 0 Because the duty of good faith is
not exculpable, it follows that the duty of rationality should not be, either.
Scholars, attorneys, and judges need to discuss fiduciary duties
efficiently, without the theoretical morass that fascinates scholars. Thus,
the law should discuss fiduciary duties, at least by default, in the manner
that is most helpful and productive. Labels ought to be assigned so as to
balance the competing goals of description and simplicity. By this criterion,
the third level of abstraction, which focuses on the paradigms for
enforcement, is superior to the second level, which merely focuses on the
potential for liability. The second level conveys very little information and
charter. Id. at 239-40. In other words, the reasonableness of their actions was protected by exculpation,
while any intentional misconduct was not.
275. Injunctive relief can be especially helpful under the Revlon model of enforcement, which
allows courts to undo contractual terms under appropriate circumstances. See Revlon, Inc. v.
MacAndrews & Forbes Holdings, Inc., 506 A.2d 173, 185 (Del. 1986); Paramount Commc'ns Inc. v.
QVC Network Inc., 637 A.2d 34, 50-51 (Del. 1994).
276. See supra note 255 and accompanying text. Although misconduct may be more likely
because of bias, that is unavoidable and not the result of director action.
277. 1 suspect that most people would assume that objectivity, which is similar to loyalty, should
not be exculpable, and that rationality, which is similar to care, should be exculpable. Thus, my
conclusions may appear counterintuitive.
278. See supra note 97 and accompanying text.
279. See supra notes 107-09 and accompanying text.
280. Another way of saying this is that, for purposes of section 144, the duty of rationality is a
subset of the duty of good faith; or, more precisely, wasteful action is not action taken in good faith.
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provides only superficial simplicity. The third level conveys significant
information with minimal complexity. Ultimately, it seems more helpful to
say that there are five fiduciary duties, some of which are more likely to
lead to liability than others, than to say that there are two fiduciary duties,
but with multiple paradigms for enforcement within them. Thus, if the
question about the number of fiduciary duties must be asked, the best
answer is five.
E. THE DANGER OF COLLAPSING THE STANDARDS OF REVIEW

Thus far, I have argued that the question-How many fiduciary duties
are there in corporate law?-is misleading and ultimately irrelevant.
Because fiduciary duties can be understood at various levels of abstraction,
the question can be answered in many different ways, each of which is
correct in some respects and inadequate in others. Moreover, the answer
does not matter as long as the inherent complexity of the law of fiduciary
duties, including the five paradigms for enforcement, is preserved.
Nevertheless, I argued that, if the question must be asked, the best answer
is five. Although this answer, too, is imperfect, there is at least one strong
reason why it might be important to say that there are five fiduciary duties
rather than two: it may be difficult to preserve the intricacies of the law if it
is insisted that there are only two fiduciary duties.
The claim that there are only two fiduciary duties is rooted in a desire
for simplicity. There is no great need for simplification, however, because
the numbers at issue are all relatively small. Five duties are not especially
more complex than two, and certainly not beyond the ability of practicing
attorneys and sitting judges. Moreover, bifurcation only leads to a false
sense of simplicity. 28 ' Eventually, jurists will realize that simplification is
futile unless the simplicity extends to substance as well as form. Inevitably,
there will be a push to reduce the number of paradigms of enforcement.
The only logical stopping point would be to have one standard of review
per fiduciary duty. Thus, the desire for simplification poses a great risk of
oversimplification.
For example, traditional loyalty and good faith could be collapsed into
one standard of review under a broad duty of loyalty. There are three ways
this can be done. First, the fairness test, or the second paradigm, could be
employed in cases involving issues of good faith.2 82 Under this scenario,
281.

See supra Part IV.D.

282.

This would be difficult to do. See infra notes 333-42 and accompanying text.
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intentional misconduct would get considerably stricter review. Second, the
intentional misconduct test, or the fourth paradigm, could be employed in
cases involving issues of traditional loyalty. Under this scenario, selfdealing would get considerably less review. Finally, an intermediate
standard of review, somewhere between fairness and intentional
misconduct, could be employed in all cases. Under this scenario, good faith
would be overenforced and loyalty would be underenforced. In each case,
precision would be sacrificed for the benefit of simplicity.
Similarly, the duty of care and the duty of rationality could be
collapsed into one standard of review under a broad duty of care. 283 One
possibility would be to employ the waste test, or the fifth paradigm, in
cases involving issues of care. Under this scenario, review of process
would become even more lenient. Another possibility would be to employ
the gross negligence test, or the first paradigm, to issues of substance.
Under this scenario, substance would get significantly greater review. A
third possibility would be to develop a new intermediate standard of review
and employ it in all cases. Under this scenario, both process and substance
suffer to some extent.2 84 In any event, precision would once again be
sacrificed for the benefit of simplicity.
The desire for simplicity is not imaginary. Scholars have suggested
the
law of fiduciary duties is becoming too complex. 28 5 I myself have
that
argued for a simplified approach to structural bias, 286 and my current
proposal would have only one standard of review per fiduciary duty
(although I would have more duties). Thus, I believe that the potential for
oversimplification should not be ignored.
In an article coauthored with then-Vice Chancellor, now Justice, Jack
Jacobs and Vice Chancellor Strine, Chancellor William Allen proposes a
reduction in the number of standards of review. 287 Allen argues that "a
rigorous functional evaluation of existing corporate law standards of review
will clarify their application, reduce their number, and facilitate the task of
283. See supra notes 97, 103 and accompanying text.
284. A fourth possibility would be to abandon review of substance altogether, but this is
something that the courts seem to be unable to do. See supra notes 102-03 and accompanying text.
285. See, e.g., William T. Allen, Jack B. Jacobs & Leo E. Strine, Jr., Function over Form: A
Reassessment of Standards of Review in Delaware CorporationLaw, 56 BUS. LAW. 1287, 1291-95
(2001).
286. See Velasco, supra note 19, at 845, 870-83.
287. See Allen, Jacobs & Strine, supra note 285. For the sake of convenience, I will refer to the
coauthors collectively as "Allen."
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corporate advisors and courts." 288 In the end, he proposes that there be
three basic standards of review corresponding roughly to the first, second,
and third paradigms for enforcement.2 89 It is worth noting, however, that
good faith was not a very well-developed concept at the time of the
article's publication. Presumably, Allen would add a fourth standard of
review corresponding to the fourth paradigm if he were making the
argument today. Thus, in general, the difference between my approach and
his is that I would recognize a fifth standard of review for waste, while he
would do away with the concept.2 9 °
Aside from the obvious difference that Allen does not recognize five
fiduciary duties, his proposal is structurally similar to mine. There are
noteworthy differences, however. For example, Allen argues that "the
relationship between the Blasius and the Unocal[] doctrines is a fruitful
subject for some doctrinal pruning," 29 1 and that the "'flavoring' difference"
between the two doctrines does not "justifly] the added doctrinal
complexity created by continuing Blasius as a separate review standard."'2 92
This conclusion is deeply problematic in two respects. First, it improperly
locates Blasius within the third paradigm (that is, reasonableness) rather
than the fourth (that is, intentional misconduct). This is entirely
understandable because it reflects how the courts currently view Blasius,
but it is nevertheless misguided. Second, it erroneously suggests that there
be
is only a "'flavoring' difference" between the two standards that could 294
293 to employ a "gimlet eye."
remedied by "trusting the courts"
Unfortunately, there may be more to Allen's claim than I would care to
acknowledge. As I have argued in earlier work, the Unocal test has been
watered down to the point where its version of the reasonableness test is
not much different from a test for intentional misconduct.2 95 In addition,
the courts seem to be backing off the compelling justification standard to
288. Seeid. at 1292.
289. See id. at 1293.
290. See id. at 1317-18; William T. Allen, Jack B. Jacobs & Leo E. Strine Jr., Realigning the
Standardof Review of DirectorDue Care with DelawarePublic Policy: A Critique of Van Gorkom and
Its Progeny as a Standardof Review Problem, 96 Nw. U. L. REV. 449, 457 (2002). It is worth noting
that, despite occasional rhetoric to the contrary, Allen does not deny that there is a fifth paradigm. See
Allen, Jacobs & Strine, supra note 285, at 1296 ("Where the business judgment standard applies, a
director will not be held liable for a decision-even one that is unreasonable-that results in a loss to
the corporation, so long as the decision is rational." (emphasis added)).
291. Allen, Jacobs & Strine, supra note 285, at 1311.
292. Id.at 1315.
293. Id. at 1320 (emphasis omitted).
294. Id.
at1316.
295. See Velasco, supra note 9, at 416-20.
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the point where it may resemble a reasonableness test. 296 Thus, there may
be less difference between Unocal and Blasius, as applied, than I would
care to admit. Yet there certainly is a great deal of difference, at least in
theory, between the third paradigm-demanding reasonableness in cases
involving structural bias-and the fourth-demanding a compelling
justification for intentional misconduct. Of course, the two tests may
sometimes lead to the same result, but they do not convey the same
concerns. As a result, over the long run, there almost certainly would be
significant differences in outcomes if there were two separate tests.29 7
298
Likewise, Allen would incorporate the Revlon test into Unocal.
According to Allen, "Except for requiring the court to evaluate the
reasonableness of the directors' action against the singular objective of
current value maximization, the Revlon standard differs little from the
Unocal standard in practical application., 299 The problem with this claim is
the enormity of the exception. I would agree that the courts should reach
the same conclusions under a true reasonableness test as they would under
Revlon. After all, if the company is for sale, it would be reasonable to seek
the best price. However, it is not at all clear that the courts would reach the
same conclusions under the existing Unocal standard. 300 The extent of
deference currently afforded to directors suggests that their conduct would
not be judged against a "singular objective."
My point here is not to criticize Allen for eliminating too many
standards of review. Rather, it is only to demonstrate that simplification
easily can lead to oversimplification. Assertions that sound plausible in the
abstract may not work out as expected. The best way to avoid this type of
mistake is to structure the law of fiduciary duties so as to make
oversimplification unlikely. The desire to associate each fiduciary duty
with exactly one standard of review can be mitigated by declaring that
there are five fiduciary duties.
296. See Williams v. Geier, 671 A.2d 1368, 1376 (Del. 1996) ("Blasius' burden of demonstrating
a 'compelling justification' is quite onerous, and.., therefore [should be] applied rarely."); Allen,
Jacobs & Strine, supra note 285, at 1311-16.
297. See, e.g., MM Cos. v. Liquid Audio, Inc., 813 A.2d 1118 (Del. 2003). In that case, the
Chancery Court had rejected the plaintiffs Blasius claim and upheld the defendants' actions under
Unocal. Id. at 1121. The Delaware Supreme Court reversed, holding for the plaintiffs under Blasius. Id.
at 1332-33. In this case, at least, the difference between the Unocal and Blasius standards was
significant.
298. See Allen, Jacobs & Strine, supra note 285, at 1320-21.
299. Id. at 1321.
300. Cf.Velasco, supra note 19, at 847-48 n. Il1 ("The Revlon decision can be seen either as an
entirely new test or merely as a specific application of Unocal.").
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F. THE COMPLEX RELATIONSHIP AMONG FIDUCIARY DUTIES

In this section, I demonstrate that the inherent complexity of fiduciary
duties extends beyond a mere number. I argue that the relationship among
the various fiduciary duties is also complex. Thus, it is inadequate to
describe fiduciary duties as lying on a linear continuum.
The inadequacy of linear thinking becomes evident when one attempts
to plot the fiduciary duties along a continuum. Hill and McDonnell's
attempt is illustrative. They view good faith as occupying the middle
ground between care and loyalty. 30 1 As discussed earlier, this does not
work. 30 2 The explanation for their error is that they saw three categories of
fiduciary duties-care, traditional loyalty, and good faith-and three
categories of standards of review-business judgment, fairness, and
intermediate scrutiny-and assumed that they matched up nicely. Because
intermediate standards of review clearly lie between fairness and business
judgment, they concluded that good faith lies between care and loyalty.
They did not realize that there are more than three categories of fiduciary
duties and more than three categories of standards of review.
Even setting aside rationality and waste, Hill and McDonnell should
have recognized four categories of fiduciary duties and of standards of
review. While care corresponds to business judgment and loyalty
corresponds to fairness, good faith does not correspond to intermediate
scrutiny. Rather, good faith requires a different standard of review and
intermediate scrutiny demands a different fiduciary duty. Had Hill and
McDonnell realized this, they could have organized their continuum
differently. Even with this insight, however, it is not obvious how they
should have done so. The relative positions of the duties of care and loyalty
are straightforward; the positions of the other three fiduciary duties are
more complicated.
For example, if fiduciary duties are plotted linearly based on the
likelihood of liability, one possible sequence would be the following:
Liability
Likely •

Liability
- Unlikely

Loyalty--Objectivity-Care-Good Faith-Rationality
The stricter standard of review means that loyalty is more likely to lead to
301.
302.

See Hill & McDonnell, supra note 13, at 1770.
See supra note 215 and accompanying text.
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liability than care. Objectivity is judged by an intermediate standard of
review and therefore falls between the two. Finally, good faith and
rationality are judged under extremely deferential standards of review and
therefore are very unlikely to lead to liability.
If we factor in the likelihood of exculpation, however, the sequence
would change significantly. It might look as follows:
Exculpability
Unlikely 4

Exculpability
0' Likely

Loyalty-Good Faith-Rationality--Objectivity--Care
Loyalty is most likely to lead to liability, while care-which is
exculpable-is least likely to do so. Good faith may also lead to liability,
but is less likely to do so than loyalty because of the burden that the
plaintiffs must bear. Finally, if, as I have argued, objectivity is exculpable
lead to liability than
and rationality is not, then rationality is more likely to
303
so.
do
to
unlikely
very
is
it
though
objectivity-even
Likelihood of liability is only one possible way of organizing
fiduciary duties on a continuum. Another possibility is the culpability of
the conduct covered by the duty. Based on this criterion, the sequence
should be the following:
Least
Most
Culpable

- Culpable

Good Faith-Loyalty-Objectivity--Care-Rationality
Clearly, intentional misconduct is the most culpable form of behavior.
Rationality-or making a bad substantive decision-is the least
culpable. 3 4 Loyalty involves conduct-conflicted action-that is more
culpable than care, 30 5 and objectivity-biased action-lies somewhere
between the two.
303. If I am wrong on either point, the sequence may vary. Other possibilities include:
Loyalty-Good Faith-Objectivity-Care-Rationality
Loyalty--Objectivity--Good Faith-Care-Rationality
Loyalty-Good Faith-Rationality -Objectivity-Care
Loyalty-Objectivity-Good Faith-Rationality-Care
304. On the other hand, if the duty of rationality is considered a proxy for the duty of good faith,
see supra note 109 and accompanying text, it becomes difficult to locate on the spectrum.
305. See, e.g., Allen, Jacobs & Strine, supra note 285, at 1301-02; Michael P. Dooley, Two
Models of Corporate Governance, 47 BUS. LAW. 461, 486 (1992) ("[Tlhe law has always dealt more
strictly with the unfaithful servant than with the careless one."); Strine et al., supranote 12, at 634.
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There are other possibilities as well. Fiduciary duties may be
organized based on the burden shareholders bear to rebut the presumption
of the business judgment rule. Based on this criterion, the sequence would
be as follows:
Lightest
Burden

q

'

Greatest
Burden

Loyalty-Objectivity--Care--Good Faith-Rationality
The lightest burden is associated with the duty of loyalty, where the
shareholders must prove only a situation rising to the level of self-dealing.
The greatest burden is under rationality, where the shareholders must prove
that the substance of a decision is so bad as to be utterly irrational and
amount to waste. In between the two is care, where the shareholders must
establish gross negligence. Objectivity is more demanding than loyalty
because the shareholders must establish not only a situation involving bias,
but also unreasonableness. And good faith is less demanding than
rationality because intentional misconduct is more likely than utterly
30 6
irrational behavior.
Likewise, fiduciary duties may be organized based on the subsequent
burden on the directors. The sequence might be as follows 30 7 :
Most
Demanding 4

Least
• Demanding

Rationality-Care--Good Faith-Loyalty-Objectivity
Rationality would seem to be the most demanding because, once the
shareholders have established that a decision was utterly irrational and
amounted to waste, there would seem to be nothing left to do but to argue
the extent of damages. The same is true for care, but it might be easier to
establish a lack of damages resulting from gross negligence than from
306.

On its face, intentional misconduct might seem to be as difficult to prove as irrationality, and

arguably more difficult. The duty of good faith, however, covers more than just malicious behavior. It

also covers other intentional conduct that the law deems misconduct, such as intentional violations of
law. As a result, the burden on the shareholders with respect to the duty of good faith is not nearly as
great as the burden with respect to the duty of rationality.
307. This spectrum is more tentative for two reasons. First, as to some duties, the business
judgment rule is rarely, if ever, rebutted, so the courts have not had very many opportunities to flesh out

the issue. See supra note 106, infra note 330 and accompanying text. Second, the law seems to be in
doubt, as will be discussed in the next part of this Article. See infra notes 327-28 and accompanying
text.
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waste.3" 8 The burden under the duty of good faith would be almost as bad.
Once the shareholders have established intentional misconduct, the
directors would have the opportunity to show a compelling justification.
This would be extremely difficult, but not necessarily impossible. 3 9 Next
is the duty of loyalty. The directors must establish that the transaction was
not only fair to the corporation and its shareholders, but also "entirely" or
"intrinsically" fair, both as to process and substance. Last is the duty of
objectivity. The directors must convince the court that their conduct was
310
not unreasonable.
In short, there are many different ways of organizing fiduciary duties.
The sequence varies greatly depending on whether they are organized
based on likelihood of liability, culpability, or burdens of proof. Moreover,
other criteria could be imagined. Each possibility reveals different
relationships among the various fiduciary duties. Thus, adopting one linear
framework as the definitive model does not do the law justice. Various
frameworks can be equally valid even though they lead to conflicting
results. What is needed is a more robust model for conceptualizing
fiduciary duties. In the next section, I propose such a model.
G. EVERY ACTION IMPLICATES EVERY FIDUCIARY DUTY
In the previous section, I demonstrated that the relationship among the

various fiduciary duties is complex and cannot be represented adequately
on a single linear continuum. I now suggest that the best way to understand
fiduciary duties is to visualize them as Venn diagrams.3 11 There are five
intersecting closed curves, each with their own realm but which intersect
each other as well. This model highlights at least two important
characteristics of fiduciary duties. First is the fact that they are capable of
relating to each other in many different ways. Second is the fact that there
308. Under current Delaware law, if the shareholder can rebut the presumption of the business
judgment rule, the directors must prove entire fairness. See Cede & Co. v. Technicolor, Inc., 634 A.2d
345, 371 (Del. 1993). Nevertheless, the inquiry may turn on the question of damages. See, e.g.,
Cinerama, Inc. v. Technicolor, Inc., 663 A.2d 1156, 1176-78 (Del. 1995).
309.
See Chesapeake Corp. v. Shore, 771 A.2d 293, 330 (Del. Ch. 2000); infra notes 336-39 and
accompanying text.
310.
At least this is true under my proposed test for the third paradigm. See supra notes 67-73 and
accompanying text.
311.
Venn diagrams are usually pictured as three overlapping circles. This image is sufficient to
convey the general sense. It is possible to create Venn diagrams for more than three sets. See generally

Wikipedia, the free encyclopedia: Venn diagram, http://en.wikipedia.org/wikiVenn-diagram
visited Aug. 4, 2010) (illustrating extensions to higher numbers of sets).

(last
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is some independent realm for each fiduciary duty, but also significant
overlap among them. Together, these characteristics reveal many
connections among fiduciary duties without suggesting that any one
perspective is uniquely correct.
In my proposed approach, each closed curve represents not particular
conduct, circumstances, or cases, but rather a particular aspect of, or
concern with respect to, fiduciary duties. Ultimately, there is one
fundamental fiduciary duty-to pursue the interests of the corporation and
its shareholders-but that core duty can be divided into at least five
different concerns. Directors should make good substantive decisions for
shareholders.3 12 Directors should employ a good decisionmaking process.
Directors also should avoid obstacles to the decisionmaking process, such
as bias and conflicts. And, of course, directors should avoid intentional
misconduct. In other words, the duty of care represents the concern that the
directors pursue the interests of the corporation and its shareholders
carefully; the duty of loyalty represents the concern that they do so loyally
(without conflicts); the duty of objectivity represents the concern that they
do so reasonably (despite bias); the duty of good faith represents the
concern that they do so honestly (without misconduct); and the duty of
rationality represents the concern that they do so rationally (without
3 13
waste).
The ramifications of this should be clear: every action by a director
implicates each of the various fiduciary duties. Strine recognizes this fact.
He acknowledges that "every act in every context implicates the duty of
loyalty" and "every act by a director implicates the duty of care." 314 This is
true not only at the second level of abstraction, where there are two duties,
3 15
but also at the third level, where there are five.
In a sense, fiduciary duties are based not on the directors' conduct but
on the shareholders' concerns. Any particular conduct can fall within the
ambit of any or all of the fiduciary duties depending on the circumstances
that are relevant to the litigation. For example, assume a hostile takeover
312. Of course, because of a lack of judicial competence to review business decisions, this aspect
is deemphasized.
313. See supra text accompanying note 248.
314. Strine et aL., supra note 12, at 639. Strine downplays the breadth of the principle, however,
by emphasizing the duty of loyalty, see id. at 634, 636, 639, and deemphasizing the duty of care, id. at
639 ("[B]ecause a loyal director must try to perform her acts with care .... ).
It would not be true at lower levels of abstraction, where specific conduct can be considered
315.
a fiduciary duty.
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situation in which directors adopt a new variant of the poison pill. 316 How
should this conduct be reviewed? The first thought would be to turn to the
duty of objectivity for the appropriate standard of review. This is a good
assumption. However, the directors' actions can violate any or all of the
fiduciary duties. For example, assume further that the directors, for the sole
purpose of preserving their jobs, specifically adopt the new poison pill in
order to block a transaction that they know would be much better for
shareholders. These directors clearly have violated the duty of objectivity
by not reasonably overcoming their bias-but they also have violated the
duty of rationality by knowingly making a very bad decision, the duty of
care by not implementing a process intended to lead to a good decision, the
duty of loyalty by not being entirely fair in the face of a conflict, and the
duty of good faith by engaging in intentional misconduct. They have
violated all five duties at once! The theory or theories that the shareholders
will pursue in court will depend on the evidence they can offer. In this
situation, the easiest standard for the shareholders to meet seems to be
reasonableness: the situation is one involving structural bias, so they have
to prove only that the transaction was unreasonable. If they have enough
evidence-for example, a record of a meeting where directors admitted to
misconduct-they can pursue other theories as well. In real life, however, it
is not easy to prove violations of most fiduciary duties. Fortunately, a
shareholder can prevail by proving breach of any one duty.317
Another example would be the duty of disclosure. As discussed
earlier, this duty has been characterized as part of all three court-recognized
fiduciary duties.318 One might argue that this suggests that disclosure is
actually a separate duty, much like good faith. 3 19 This is not the case,
however. At a very low level of abstraction, disclosure might be
characterized as a fiduciary duty, but not at the second or third levels.
Rather, at higher levels of abstraction, disclosure constitutes conduct that is
subject to each of the fiduciary duties. Thus, inadequate disclosure can be a
breach of any or all of the duties, depending on the circumstances. Assume,
for example, that directors knowingly commission a faulty study in order to
justify a false disclosure that will benefit them substantially. The most
obvious violation is the duty of good faith, because there was dishonesty
that was intentional. There is also a violation of the duty of loyalty,
316.

For a description of the poison pill, see Julian Velasco, Just Do It: An Antidote to the Poison

Pill, 52 EMORY L.J. 849, 856-68 (2003).

317.
318.
319.

Of course, shareholders will not recover damages if the duty is exculpable.
See supra note 264 and accompanying text.
Cf supra text accompanying note 246.
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however, because there was a material conflict together with unfairness.
There is a violation of objectivity, because the directors acted unreasonably
in the face of bias. In addition, there is a violation of the duty of care,
because they knowingly commissioned a faulty study. Finally, if the result
is sufficiently egregious, there may be a violation of the duty of rationality.
Depending on the circumstances, there may or may not be enough evidence
to pursue each of these theories. Theoretically, at least, inadequate
disclosure can violate any or all of the fiduciary duties.
Thus, the appropriate way to think about fiduciary duties is not that
certain conduct will fall within certain duties; there just happens to be a
nice fit in many cases. 320 Rather it is the concern being pursued by the
shareholders that determines which duty is litigated. Once director conduct
has been called into question, the concern must be identified: Was the
conduct intentional? Was it careless? Was it biased? Was it conflicted? Or
was it so bad that liability should follow? Ultimately, the one fundamental
fiduciary duty is involved, The individual fiduciary duties are simply
different ways of determining whether there was a breach.
This approach to fiduciary duties helps to explain two matters that are
somewhat problematic under more conventional approaches. The first is
exculpation. The exculpability of some fiduciary duties and not others
suggests that the law is indifferent to certain fiduciary duties.3 21 This is
theoretically troubling. It might be fine to suggest that the law is more
concerned about certain fiduciary duties than others, but it seems
unacceptable to suggest that the law is indifferent to something that it
considers a fiduciary duty. However, if there is only one fiduciary duty and
what are commonly called fiduciary duties reflect different aspects of that
one duty and the type of evidence that can be offered in support of a claim
of breach, then exculpation is less problematic. Exculpation does not
suggest that the law is indifferent to anything. Rather, it only reflects the
judgment that the remedies available to the shareholders should vary
depending on the concern at hand and the available evidence. Far from
being problematic, this seems eminently sensible.
In addition, this approach to fiduciary duties does a better job of
320. For example, self-dealing fits well with loyalty, takeovers fit well with structural bias, and
sloppiness fits well with care.
321. See, e.g., John C. Coffee, Jr., The Mandatory/EnablingBalance in CorporateLaw: An Essay
on the JudicialRole, 89 COLUM. L. REV. 1618, 1650 (1989) ("While the duty of loyalty is at the core of
fiduciary duties, the duty of care seems more marginal."); Johnson, supra note 140, at 28.
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explaining Caremark322 duties than does Stone. Despite what the Delaware
Supreme Court suggests, the Caremark duty to monitor seems rather
obviously to be a component of the duty of care. 323 For Stone to reposition
the duty to monitor under the duty of loyalty (via the duty of good faith)
was not only surprising, but also disturbing. Essentially, the court
converted a duty of care claim, which the legislature had determined should
be exculpable, into a duty of loyalty issue, which is not. 24 Understood in
this way, Stone becomes an example of inappropriate judicial activism. My
approach, on the other hand, makes better sense of the holding. The duty to
monitor is not a fiduciary duty at the third level of abstraction; it is only
conduct. As such, a failure to monitor is capable of violating any of the
fiduciary duties, depending on the circumstances. The Delaware statute
does not permit exculpation of the duty to monitor, but only of the duty of
care. 32 5 To the extent that a failure to monitor reflects carelessness, it
remains exculpable. If the failure to monitor reflects intentional
misconduct, however, it also violates a duty of good faith and is not
exculpable. This approach does not entail judicial activism. It fully respects
both the letter and the spirit of the exculpation statute.
In short, the law of fiduciary duties is inherently complex. Fiduciary
duties should not be forced into simplistic frameworks. Rather, the richness
of the relationships among them should be acknowledged and respected.
The various fiduciary duties represent different aspects of the one
fundamental fiduciary duty. Thus, although they are independent of each
other, they are also necessarily related and overlap with one another.
Nevertheless, each of the fiduciary duties at the third level of abstraction,
and each of the five paradigms for enforcement, has an important role in
the law of fiduciary duties.
H. SUMMARY

This part addresses how fiduciary duties ought to be understood. The
most important insight is that fiduciary duties can be viewed at varying
322.

In re Caremark Int'l Inc. Derivative Litig., 698 A.2d 959 (Del. Ch. 1996).

323.

That is how the author of the opinion, Chancellor Allen, characterized it. See id. at 971;

WILLIAM T. ALLEN & REINIER KRAAKMAN, COMMENTARIES AND CASES ON THE LAW OF BUSINESS
ORGANIZATION 279 (2003); Hill & McDonnell, supra note 13, at 1777-78; Johnson, supra note 231, at
831. Even Stone acknowledges that Caremarkdid not explicitly characterize itself otherwise. See Stone
ex reL AmSouth Bancorporation v. Ritter, 911 A.2d 362, 369-70 (2006).
324. Strine insists that this is not what happens under Stone. See Strine et al., supra note 12, at

686-88.
325.

See DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 8, § 102(b)(7) (2010).
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levels of abstraction. Thus, conflicting assertions about fiduciary duties can
be correct in different respects. At the first and highest level of abstraction,
there is only one fundamental fiduciary duty: to pursue the interests of the
corporation and its shareholders. At a second level of abstraction, that core
duty can be divided into two categories based on culpability or the
likelihood of liability. At a third level of abstraction, fiduciary duties can be
divided based on the paradigms for enforcement, which expands on the
triadic formulation. At the fourth and lower levels of abstraction,
specificity increases, eventually to the point where specific conduct can be
considered a fiduciary duty.
The current debate about the number of fiduciary duties essentially
revolves around the question of which level of abstraction, the second or
the third, is the appropriate default level for discussions of fiduciary duties.
I argue that the answer does not truly matter as long as the complexity of
the law-especially the five paradigms for enforcement-is preserved. I
also argue, however, that the third level of abstraction is superior because it
is much more descriptive without being overly complex. Moreover, the
conclusion that there are two fiduciary duties may lead to a dangerous
oversimplification of the law. Thus, the best answer to the question-How
many fiduciary duties are there in corporate law?-is that there are five: in
addition to care, loyalty, and good faith, there are objectivity and
rationality.
Furthermore, fiduciary duties cannot be described adequately in
simple terms. The law is too complex, and there is too much overlap among
fiduciary duties to permit this. Thus, fiduciary duties should be
conceptualized not as a linear continuum, but as occupying a twodimensional area, much like a Venn diagram. Each fiduciary duty
represents not particular conduct on the part of directors, but rather an
aspect of the one fiduciary duty that concerns the shareholders. Thus, every
action by a director implicates every fiduciary duty and theoretically can
violate any or all of them depending on the circumstances and the evidence
that the shareholders are able to offer. This approach gives real significance
to the notion that there is one fundamental fiduciary duty while preserving
the richness and nuance of the law.
V. A UNIFIED STANDARD OF REVIEW?
It is commonly thought that breaches of the duty of care are reviewed
under the business judgment rule while breaches of the duty of loyalty are
reviewed under the entire fairness test. This is not how it works in
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Delaware; at least not since 1993. In that year, the Delaware Supreme
Court announced a unified test for the review of breach of fiduciary duty.
Now, both the business judgment rule and the entire fairness test are
applicable to each and every claim of breach of fiduciary duty.
In this part, I consider how my approach to fiduciary duties would
work in Delaware. In Section A, I describe and distinguish the two models
for the relationship between the business judgment rule and the entire
fairness test. In Section B, I demonstrate that the Delaware model is
inherently problematic, but that my five-duty approach works at least as
well as Delaware's own approach. In Section C, I describe how my
approach would work under the more traditional model. I also argue that
the traditional model is superior and that Delaware should abandon its
unified test.
A. Two MODELS

There are two possible models for the relationship between the
business judgment rule and the entire fairness test. The first, which I call
the "Traditional Model," is the relationship that they had before 1993, and
that they still have in many people's minds. The second, which I call the
"Delaware Model," is the relationship that was developed in the case of
Cede & Co. 326

Under the Traditional Model, the business judgment rule and the
entire fairness test are independent of each other. They are two distinct
standards of review. Cases involving duty of care claims are evaluated
under the business judgment rule, while cases involving duty of loyalty
claims are evaluated under the entire fairness test. Under the Delaware
Model, the business judgment rule and the entire fairness test are intimately
related. Together, they form a unified standard of review. Every case
involving a fiduciary duty claim begins with the business judgment rule
and ends with the entire fairness test. The business judgment rule provides
a presumption that the directors have satisfied their fiduciary duties. If the
shareholders rebut this presumption, the directors bear the burden of
proving that the transaction was fair. This is true not only of duty of loyalty
claims, but also of duty of care claims.
At the present time, the Delaware Model appears to be the law of
Delaware. The Delaware Model has been the subject of much criticism,
326.

Cede & Co. v. Technicolor, Inc., 634 A.2d 345 (Del. 1993).
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however. This criticism comes not only from scholars, 327 but also from
Delaware judges writing extrajudicially. 32 8 Moreover, because it is rare for
a shareholder to overcome the presumption of the business judgment rule in
a duty of care case, the Delaware courts have not had many opportunities to
apply the Delaware Model after Cede & Co. Thus, it is not clear that the
Delaware Model is settled law in Delaware.
In most cases, there is not much practical difference between the
Delaware Model and the Traditional Model. In duty of loyalty cases, the
presumption of the business judgment rule is easily rebutted by a selfdealing transaction, without more, 329 and litigation focuses on the entire
fairness test. In duty of care cases, the presumption of the business
judgment rule is rarely rebutted, so the entire fairness test never comes into
play.33 ° In fact, since Cede & Co., there has not been a single duty of care
case in Delaware in which the presumption of the business judgment rule
was rebutted and the entire fairness test was applied. Thus, for practical
purposes, the Traditional Model is a fair, if not entirely accurate,
description of Delaware law.
Beyond this superficial level, however, the distinction becomes
increasingly important. For example, in cases where the difference matters,
it can be significant. Moreover, as the number of fiduciary duties increases
from two to five, it becomes less fair to say that the Traditional Model and
the Delaware Model are functionally equivalent. In the remaining sections,
I will consider the ramifications of the two models for my approach to
fiduciary duties.
B. FIVE FIDUCIARY DUTIES UNDER THE DELAWARE MODEL

My approach to fiduciary duties is compatible with the Delaware
327. See, e.g., Bishop, supra note 12, at 918-19; Johnson, supra note 101, at 630-37.
328. See, e.g., Allen, Jacobs & Strine, supra note 285, at i30i-05; Symposium, Judicial
Standards of Review of CorporateFiduciary Action, 26 DEL. J. CORP. L. 995, 1002-04 (2001) (remarks
of Vice Chancellor, now Justice Jacobs).
329. See Velasco, supra note 19, at 835. At one point, the court in Cede & Co. seems to disagree:
"Provided that the terms of 8 Del. C. § 144 are met, self-interest, alone, is not a disqualifying factor
even for a director. To disqualify a director, for rule rebuttal purposes, there must be evidence of
disloyalty." Cede & Co., 634 A.2d at 363. The court's comment refers not to the entire fairness test
itself, however, but rather to the effect of one director's conflict to a cleansing vote under section 144.
Id.
330. Before Van Gorkom, there were few instances, if any, of liability under the duty of care. See
Strine et al., supra note 12, at 641 n.24 ("Before [Van Gorkom], the duty of care had largely an
admonitory, rather than enforceable, basis in American corporate law.").
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Model. The Delaware Model provides that every claim of fiduciary duty
begins with the business judgment rule and ends with the entire fairness
test. In between the two are a number of filters pursuant to which the
shareholders may rebut the presumption of the business judgment rule.
Cede & Co. contemplated that there would be three filters, one for each of
the triads. 331 In order to rebut the presumption with respect to the duty of
care, the shareholders must establish gross negligence. In order to rebut the
presumption with respect to the duty of loyalty, the shareholders must
establish self-dealing. In order to rebut the presumption with respect to
good faith, the shareholders must establish intentional misconduct. Thus,
the Delaware Model may be visualized as follows:
FIGURE 1. The Delaware Model

BUSINESS JUDGMENT RULE

CARE
gross
negligence

LOYALTY self-dealing

GOOD
FAITH
intentional
misconduct

ENTIRE FAIRNESS TEST
Even at this superficial level, my approach fits in more neatly than
does Delaware's own approach, as embodied in Stone and Unocal. With
appropriate caveats, I claim that there are five fiduciary duties. This
approach can easily accommodate the Delaware Model. All that is required
is having five filters instead of three in between the business judgment rule
and the entire fairness test. There would be one filter for each fiduciary
331. See Cede & Co., 634 A.2d at 361 ("To rebut the [business judgment] rule, a shareholder
plaintiff assumes the burden of providing evidence that directors, in reaching their challenged decision,
breached any one of the triads of their fiduciary duty-good faith, loyalty, or due care."). But see id. at
371 ("A breach of either the duty of loyalty or the duty of care rebuts the presumption that the directors
have acted in the best interests of the shareholders, and requires the directors to prove that the
transaction was entirely fair.").
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duty which, in turn, represents a paradigm for enforcement. Thus, in
addition to the three methods contemplated in Cede & Co., the shareholders
could rebut the presumption of the business judgment rule with respect to
the duty of objectivity by establishing unreasonableness, or, with respect to
the duty of rationality by establishing waste. The basic framework of the
Delaware Model suffers no disruption. My approach under the Delaware
Model could be visualized as follows:
FIGURE 2. The Delaware Model with Five Fiduciary Duties

BUSINESS JUDGMENT RULE

CARE

OBJECTIVITY

LOYALTY

GOOD
FAITH

RATIONALITY

gross
negligence

structural
bias

self-dealing

intentional
misconduct

waste

ENTIRE FAIRNESS TEST
Compare Delaware's own approach. Under Stone, the three filters
contemplated by Cede & Co. remain intact. There is no neat correlation
between filters and fiduciary duties, however. Rather, the presumption of
the business judgment rule is rebuttable in two ways with respect to the
duty of loyalty and in a third way with respect to the duty of care. This may
not be especially complex, but it is unnecessarily so.
More importantly, the duty of objectivity, structural bias, and the
intermediate standards of review are not accounted for. Under Unocal,
enhanced scrutiny cannot be described as a filter between the business
judgment rule and the entire fairness test. Rather, it is characterized as a
"threshold" inquiry, "before the protections of the business judgment rule
may be conferred.

332

This simply does not make sense within the

framework of the Delaware Model. It reflects the fact that Unocal was
decided before Cede & Co. The Delaware Model did not yet exist, and
332.

Unocal Corp. v. Mesa Petroleum Co., 493 A.2d 946, 954 (Del. 1985).
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enhanced scrutiny was developed with the Traditional Model in mind.
There, a threshold inquiry makes sense: enhanced scrutiny is a tool to
determine whether there is a real duty of loyalty issue, in which case the
entire fairness test applies, or whether the issues arise under the duty of
care, in which case the business judgment rule applies. Unocal's
framework can be depicted in this manner:
FIGURE 3. Unocal's Enhanced Scrutiny
CARE

(OBJECTIVITY)

F

LOYALTY

Enhanced Scrutiny

Business Judgment Rule

Entire Fairness Test

In order to fit Unocal's enhanced scrutiny under the Delaware Model, the
courts must abandon the notion that it is a threshold inquiry. Viewed as just
another filter providing an intermediate level of review, enhanced scrutiny
can fit in nicely within the Delaware Model. It could be depicted in the
following manner:
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FIGURE 4. The Delaware Model with Four Fiduciary Duties

BUSINESS JUDGMENT RULE

CARE

OBJECTOBETIVITY

gross
negligence

structural
bias

LOYALTY -

GOOD
FAIT
FAITH

self-dealing_ intentional
misconduct

ENTIRE FAIRNESS TEST
This approach, however, is essentially the same as mine. All that
remains to be accounted for is the duty of rationality. It is possible to say
that substance lies outside of the unified framework altogether. Because the
shareholders must prove waste, however, it seems more accurate to
describe rationality as yet another way to rebut the presumption of the
business judgment rule. In other words, it is a fifth filter.
In the end, both the Delaware approach and my own can be fit within
the Delaware Model. Mine fits a little more neatly, however. Moreover, the
Delaware approach fits only to the extent that it is altered to resemble mine.
Taking a closer look at the Delaware Model complicates matters. As
many commentators have noted, applying the entire fairness test outside of
an interested transaction context is theoretically difficult.3 33 Not all director
conduct that may constitute a breach of fiduciary duty can be characterized
as a discrete transaction. Sometimes, the breach is simply inaction. While it
may be simple to classify transactions as fair or unfair, it is more difficult
to do so with less discrete actions or inaction.
Such problems, however, are inherent to the unified approach of the
Delaware Model. They stem from the fact that the entire fairness test was
never designed to be a universal test. It was intended for one particular
context: the duty of loyalty, or the second paradigm for enforcement of
333. See Allen, Jacobs & Strine, supra note 285, at 1302-03; Bainbridge, Lopez & Oklan, supra
note 12, at 585.
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fiduciary duties. Because of the similarity, it may also work reasonably
well in the context of the duty of objectivity or the third paradigm for
enforcement-provided that the measure of fairness is understood to be
reasonableness. Beyond those contexts, however, one must expect an
imperfect fit. These imperfections apply to every approach, Delaware's as
well as mine.
Despite the inherent limitations of the entire fairness test, my approach
can accommodate the Delaware Model as well as any other. All that is
necessary is that one understand that fairness can mean different things in
different contexts. Consider, for example, the duty of care. A fairness
inquiry is a bit complicated: it would be odd to conclude that a grossly
negligent decision is entirely fair.334 Nevertheless, the inquiry can be
whether, despite the gross negligence, the result remains fair to the
shareholders. 335 This is not too difficult to rationalize. Gross negligence
would not necessarily lead to a bad result; it is merely more likely to do so.
Despite a deficient process, the end result may be fine-if only by luck. In
a sense, the fairness inquiry becomes a proxy for the issue of damages: if
the shareholders have been harmed, then the directors will not be able to
show fairness, while if the shareholders have not been harmed in any way,
then perhaps the directors can.
The fairness inquiry is trickier in cases involving the duty of good
faith. The issue becomes whether, despite intentional misconduct, it would
be fair not to hold directors liable.3 36 It may seem hard to imagine
circumstances that satisfy such a test, but there are at least two possibilities.
The first situation is where, despite intentional misconduct, there was no
harm suffered by the shareholders. For example, despite being malicious,
the directors failed and were unable to harm the shareholders. Perhaps
directors should be held accountable anyway, but that is not obviously the
case. The second situation is where there was no malice. This is possible
because good faith covers more than intent to harm; it covers any
intentional conduct that the law deems misconduct.33 7 For example, it
would cover an intentional violation of law or an intent to thwart a
shareholder vote. Such behavior is deemed misconduct, but it does not
necessarily stem from malice. It may be justifiable or excusable if directors
334.
the force
335.
336.
337.

Cf Cinerama, Inc. v. Technicolor, Inc., 663 A.2d 1134, 1140 (Del. Ch. 1995) ("I recognize
of the claim that a process that is uninformed can never be fair to shareholders.").
This was the determination in Cede & Co. See Cinerama, 663 A.2d at 1178-80.
See supra note 96 and accompanying text.
See supra notes 81-82 and accompanying text.
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can show a compelling justification. 338 A compelling justification for an
intent to harm may be difficult to imagine, but a compelling justification
339 If
for conduct that is merely deemed misconduct is easier to imagine.
directors had a compelling justification for their intentional misconduct,
then perhaps they can survive the fairness inquiry.
The duty of rationality truly tests the limits of fairness as a universal
test. The issue becomes whether an utterly irrational decision that amounts
to waste can be considered fair. On the one hand, it is almost impossible to
imagine how such a test can be satisfied. On the other hand, it is also very
difficult to imagine how the shareholders could establish irrationality or
waste in the first place. 340 Especially because the situation is almost
entirely hypothetical, there is no need for a per se rule. Directors could be
given the opportunity to show fairness-which would translate into
justification-even if it is
something at least as demanding as a compelling
34 1
unlikely that they will be able to do so.
In other words, under the Delaware Model, the fairness inquiry is not
exactly an application of the entire fairness test or the second paradigm for
enforcement. Rather, it is a method to shift the burden of proof onto the
directors after the shareholders have rebutted the presumption of the
business judgment rule. 342 Understood in this way, it is reasonably
workable.
Finally, there is the issue of remedies. Many commentators have
criticized the Delaware Model with respect to remedies. They argue that
rescission or rescissory damages, which is the usual remedy, is often
inappropriate in nonloyalty contexts.343 That is certainly true. Nevertheless,
it is clear in Delaware that the courts have broad discretion in deciding on
an appropriate remedy after a fairness inquiry. They may award any
equitable or monetary relief, as appropriate. 344 Thus, there is no problem
here. Damages can be awarded when appropriate; other cases could be
338. Blasius Indus., Inc. v. Atlas Corp., 564 A.2d 651, 660-61 (Del. Ch. 1988).
339. See, e.g., Chesapeake Corp. v. Shore, 771 A.2d 293, 320 (Del. Ch. 2000) (describing delay
"to provide more time for deliberations" as a "board action[] that influence[s] the electoral process in
[a] legitimate way[]").
340. See supra notes 105-07 and accompanying text.
341. Alternatively, the courts could simply acknowledge that the burden is impossible to meet
once waste has been established and find the directors liable.
Cede & Co. v. Technicolor, Inc., 634 A.2d 345, 369 (Del. 1993).
342.
See, e.g., Bainbridge, Lopez & Oklan, supranote 12, at 587-88.
343.
344. Weinberger v. UOP, Inc., 457 A.2d 701, 714 (Del. 1983) ("[Flashion any form of equitable
and monetary relief as may be appropriate .... ); quoted in Cede & Co., 634 A.2d at 371.
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34 5
limited to injunctive relief.

In short, my approach and its five-fiduciary-duty framework can exist
within the Delaware Model. Litigation can begin with the presumption of
the business judgment rule. The shareholders would have the burden of
rebutting that presumption with respect to the five fiduciary duties which
are based on the five paradigms for enforcement. Once they have rebutted
the presumption of the business judgment rule, the burden would shift to
the directors to establish fairness, the exact meaning of which would
depend on the circumstances. If the directors fail to do so, the court can
award an appropriate remedy.
C. FIVE FIDUCIARY DUTIES UNDER THE TRADITIONAL MODEL
Although my approach works reasonably well within the Delaware
Model, it works even better within the Traditional Model. Under the
Traditional Model, each of the fiduciary duties would represent one of the
five paradigms for enforcement of the one fiduciary duty. There would be
five distinct standards of review, with no effort to unify them under a grand
theory. Rather, each test would be tailor-made for the circumstances. My
approach under the Traditional Model can be pictured as follows:

345. Some commentators seem to believe that Cede & Co. relieved the shareholders of any burden
to prove damages under the Delaware Model. See, e.g., ALLEN & KRAAKMAN, supra note 323, at 261. I
am not so sure. Cede & Co. merely stated that proof of damages was not necessary for rule rebuttal
purposes. See Cede & Co., 634 A.2d at 371 ("To require proof of injury as a component of the proof
necessary to rebut the business judgment presumption would be to convert the burden shifting process
from a threshold determination of the appropriate standard of review to a dispositive adjudication on the
merits."). The court never stated what would have to be proved if the shareholders were to rebut the
presumption of the business judgment rule and the directors were to fail to establish fairness. Some
have assumed that damages would follow automatically. I do not believe that is a fair reading of the
opinion. To the contrary, the court indicated that any damages should be "susceptible to proof' and
"appropriate under the circumstances." Id. It is hard to see how damages could be appropriate if no
injury can be proven.
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FIGURE 5. The Traditional Model with Five Fiduciary Duties
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Duty of care claims would be reviewed under the first paradigm, or
the business judgment rule. The rule would be understood not so much as a
presumption, but rather as a standard of review. 3 46 That standard would be
gross negligence. 34 7 If the shareholders can establish gross negligence, then
they would be entitled to damages for any injury they could prove. In many
cases, the real issue likely would not be about the existence of injury, but
rather about causation. However, that inquiry likely would be affected by
the fact that the directors already would have been shown to be not merely
negligent, but grossly negligent. If damages cannot be proven, or if
directors are protected by an exculpation provision, an equitable remedy
would remain available.
Duty of loyalty claims would be reviewed under the second paradigm,
or the entire fairness test. The shareholders would have to show only a
conflict that rises to the level of self-dealing, and the burden would then
shift to the directors to show that the transaction was entirely fair.348 If the
directors cannot establish fairness, then the court would be free to award
any appropriate remedy. 349 Presumably, an award of damages would be
appropriate only to the extent that an injury could be shown. Otherwise, the
remedy would be limited to injunctive relief or, perhaps, nominal damages.
Duty of objectivity claims would be evaluated under the third
paradigm, or the reasonableness test. This paradigm is less straightforward
346. It would be possible to preserve a presumption aspect of the business judgment rule: this
would be the requirement that, in order to survive a motion to dismiss, the shareholders must not merely
allege negligence, but make a satisfactory showing of gross negligence. Even so, it is better classified as
a pleading requirement than as a presumption.
347. See Aronson v. Lewis, 473 A.2d 805, 812 (Del. 1984), overruledon othergrounds by Brehm
v. Eisner, 746 A.2d 244, 254 (Del. 2000).
348. See supra notes 45-46 and accompanying text.
349. See supra note 344 and accompanying text.
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than the others.35 ° In my opinion, the shareholders should bear the burden
of establishing both a situation involving structural bias and an
unreasonable decision on the part of directors. 351 If they can do that, they
would be entitled to any damages they can prove, 352 or any other
appropriate equitable relief.
Duty of good faith claims would be evaluated under the fourth
paradigm, or an intent test. The shareholders would bear the heavy burden
of establishing intentional misconduct.3 53 If they meet this burden, the
directors would bear the commensurately heavy burden of establishing a
compelling justification. 35 4 If the directors fail to meet that burden, the
shareholders would be entitled to damages for any injury that is
established, or some other equitable relief.
Finally, the duty of rationality would be evaluated under the fifth
paradigm, or the waste test. The shareholders would bear the extremely
heavy burden of establishing that the director's conduct was utterly
irrational and amounted to waste. 355 If they can do that, then a damages
award would seem to be appropriate to the extent of the waste.
The practical difference between the Traditional Model and the
Delaware Model is relatively small. In each case, as in litigation generally,
there is a presumption that the defendant is "innocent" and there is a burden
on the plaintiff to prove otherwise. If the plaintiff meets this burden then, to
some extent or other, the burden shifts to the defendant. Even though the
burden technically remains with the shareholders under the Traditional
Model, the difference from the Delaware Model is not all that great. This is
because the standard is a preponderance of the evidence, or more likely
than not.356 The directors must treat this as if the burden were on
themselves in any event.
Yet, despite their similarities, the Traditional Model is superior to the
Delaware Model. It is simpler, cleaner, and more sensible. The Delaware
Model is awkward and at times seems forced. The Delaware Model might
be preferable to the Traditional Model if there were countervailing benefits,
350.
351.
352.
353.
354.
355.
356.

See supra note 73 and accompanying text.
See Velasco, supra note 19, at 876-79.
Unless, of course, directors are exculpated. See supra notes 272-76 and accompanying text.
See supra notes 80-81 and accompanying text.
See supra notes 89-96 and accompanying text.
See supra notes 105-06 and accompanying text.
See BLACK'S LAW DICTIONARY 1301 (9th ed. 2009) (defining "preponderance of the

evidence").
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but I fail to see any. As a practical matter, the unified test of the Delaware
Model does not offer the benefit of simplicity. Where the Traditional
Model offers a choice of five standards of review, the Delaware Model
offers five filters surrounded by both the business judgment rule and the
entire fairness test. If anything, the Delaware Model is more complicated.
Moreover, as a theoretical matter, the unified test of the Delaware Model
offers few advantages. Any benefit from a unified approach is outweighed
by the intellectual awkwardness of trying to fit disparate concepts into a
single mold.
I have argued throughout this paper that the question-How many
fiduciary duties are there in corporate law?-is not an appropriate question.
I also have argued that, if the question must be asked, then the best answer
is five. For similar reasons, I believe that the question-How many tests
are there for breach of fiduciary duty in corporate law?-is an unnecessary
question. As long as the five paradigms for the enforcement of fiduciary
duties are preserved, the answer to either question is irrelevant.
Nevertheless, practical considerations suggest that, once again, the best
answer is five.
Thus, I propose that Delaware courts abandon the unified test of Cede
& Co. and return to a more traditional model. Each fiduciary duty should
be covered by its own standard(s) of review. There is no need to unify these
very different tests.
VI. CONCLUSION
The current debate on the number of fiduciary duties in corporate law
focuses on whether there should be two or three. Ultimately, it boils down
to a question of whether good faith should be considered a separate and
independent duty or a part of the duty of loyalty. Everyone agrees that, in
substance, there is and should be what may colloquially be considered a
duty of good faith. Thus, the debate is almost entirely academic, with little
practical significance.
I argue that a better answer would be that there are five fiduciary
duties. Of course, my answer is also somewhat academic and is not
uniquely correct. In demonstrating why this is so, however, I hope to have
shed light on the nature of fiduciary duties. My approach provides a robust
framework for the discussion, application, and development of the law of
fiduciary duties. In addition, I have shown why the debate matters from a
practical standpoint. The urge to simplify creates a risk of
oversimplification. Thus, the most promising approach to fiduciary duties
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